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ABSTRACT
In the artificial intelligence literature, three forms of reasoning are commonly employed
to understand agent behavior: inductive, deductive, and abductive. More recently, data-
driven approaches leveraging ideas such as machine learning, data mining, and social
network analysis have gained popularity. While data-driven variants of the aforementioned
forms of reasoning have been applied separately, there is little work on how data-driven
approaches across all three forms relate and lend themselves to practical applications. Given
an agent behavior and the percept sequence, how one can identify a specific outcome such
as the likeliest explanation? To address real-world problems, it is vital to understand the
different types of reasonings which can lead to better data-driven inference.
This dissertation has laid the groundwork for studying these relationships and applying
them to three real-world problems. In criminal modeling, inductive and deductive reasonings
are applied to early prediction of violent criminal gang members. To address this problem the
features derived from the co-arrestee social network as well as geographical and temporal
features are leveraged. Then, a data-driven variant of geospatial abductive inference is
studied in missing person problem to locate the missing person. Finally, induction and
abduction reasonings are studied for identifying pathogenic accounts of a cascade in social
networks.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
In the artificial intelligence literature, three forms of reasoning are commonly employed
to understand agent behavior: deductive, inductive, and abudctive. Deductive inference
infers a result for a specific case given a premise while induction inference is to infer a
premise given the case and result. Abductive inference is to infer the likeliest possible
explanation given a set of facts. In abduction, we need to make the hypotheses as well as
finding the most plausible one.
More recently, data-driven approaches leveraging ideas such as machine learning, data
mining, and social network analysis have gained popularity. While data-driven variants of the
aforementioned forms of reasoning have been applied separately, there is less work on how
these approaches relate and lend themselves to practical applications. In this dissertation, we
aim to answer the following fundamental questions: How can we identify a specific outcome
given the agent behavior and the percept sequence? How can real-world problems be solved
using the combination of reasoning methods? When we have to use abductive, inductive
or deductive reasonings? How can we infer the likeliest explanation given a set of facts?
Answers to such questions are vital to understand the different types of reasonings and can
lead to better data driven inference.
In our research, we propose combination of inference methods to identify outcomes of the
agents. These methods are designed to support the objectives of studying the relationships
among reasoning approaches and applying them to real-world problems. This thesis is
organized as follows:
Chapter 2. We wish to reason if the agent takes a specific type of action as the next action,
given a model of past agent behaviors. In this regard, we consider the following
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problem, early prediction of violent criminal gang members using deductive reasoning.
Our approach relies on modified centrality measures that take into account additional
data of the individuals in the social network of co-arrestees which together with other
arrest metadata provide a rich set of features for a classification algorithm. We evaluate
our method using real-world offender data from Chicago Police Department. We show
our approach obtains high precision and recall (0.89 and 0.78 respectively) in the
case where the entire network is known and out-performs current approaches used by
law-enforcement to the problem in the case where the network is discovered overtime
by virtue of new arrests - mimicking real-world law-enforcement operations [64].
Chapter 3. In this chapter, we studied generating the most plausible explanations given a
set of observations. We introduce the Missing Person Intelligence Synthesis Toolkit
(MIST) which leverages a data-driven variant of geospatial abductive inference for
finding missing persons. The system takes search locations provided by a group of
experts and rank-orders them based on the probability assigned to areas based on
the prior performance of the experts taken as a group. Evaluation of our approach
compared to the current practices employed by the Find Me Group (a non-profit
organization led by former law enforcement professionals dedicated to missing persons
cases) demonstrates that we significantly reduce the search area– leading to a reduction
of 53 square miles over 29 cases we examined in our experiments [65].
Chapter 4. In this chapter, we aim to find the set of best explanations given extremist cas-
cades. “Pathogenic Social Media” accounts have the capability of spreading harmful
mis-information to viral proportions. We introduced an unsupervised causality-based
framework that leverages label propagation. This approach identifies these users with-
out using network structure, cascade path information, content and user’s information.
We evaluate our approach using Twitter dataset. We show our approach obtains higher
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precision (0.75) in identifying pathogenic social media accounts in comparison with
random (precision of 0.11) and existing bot detection (precision of 0.16) methods [66].
Chapter 5. And finally, in this chapter, we adopt the causal inference framework along
with graph-based metrics in order to distinguish pathogenic social media accounts
from normal users within a short time of their activities. We propose both supervised
and semi-supervised approaches without taking the network information and content
into account. Results on a real-world dataset from Twitter accentuates the advantage
of our proposed frameworks. We show our approach achieves 0.28 improvement in
F1 score over existing approaches with the precision of 0.90 and F1 score 0.63 [67].
The description of the aforementioned problems is summarized in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Description of Studied Agents
Agent Percept sequence Agent behavior Outcome Reasoning
Violence Prediction
Criminal gang
member
Social network Past crimes Violent behavior
Induction,
Deduction
Missing person
Missing person
case
Reporters Reported locations
Most potential
location
Induction,
Abduction
Pathogenic account
detection
Extremist cascade
Network (missing),
Past cascades
Users of the cascade Pathogenic accounts
Induction,
Abduction
Pathogenic account
detection
Extremist cascade
Network (missing),
Past cascades
Users of the cascade
Minimum set of
Pathogenic accounts
Induction,
Abduction
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Chapter 2
EARLY IDENTIFICATION OF VIOLENT CRIMINAL GANG MEMBERS
2.1 Introduction
Gang violence is a major problem in the United States [8, 9] - accounting for 20 to
50 percent of homicides in many major cities [33]. Yet, law enforcement actually has
existing data on many of these groups. For example the underlying social network structure
is often recorded by law-enforcement and has previously been shown useful in enabling
“smart policing” tactics [48] and improving law-enforcement’s understanding of a gang’s
organizational structure [51]. In this chapter, we look to leverage this gang social network
information to create features that allows us to classify individuals as potentially violent.
While the results of such a classifier are insufficient to lead to arrests, it is able to provide
the police leads to individuals who are likely to be involved in violence, allowing for a
more focused policing with respect to patrols and intelligence gathering. Our key aim is to
significantly reduce the population of potential violent gang members which will lead to
more efficient policing.
In this research, we introduce our method for identifying potentially violent gang
members that leverages features derived from the co-arestee social network of criminal
gangs in a classifier to identify potentially violent individuals. We note that this classification
problem is particularly difficult due to not only data imbalances, but also due to the fact
that many violent crimes are conducted due to heightened emotions - and hence difficult
to identify. Though we augment our network-based features with some additional meta-
data from the arrest records, our approach does not leverage features concerning the race,
ethnicity, or gender of individuals in the social network. We evaluate our method using
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real-world offender data from the Chicago Police Department. This chapter makes the
following contributions:
• We discuss how centrality measurements such as degree, closeness, and betweenness
when modified to account for metadata about past offenses such as the type of offense
and whether the offense was classified as “violent” can serve as robust features for
identifying violent offenders.
• We show how the network features, combined with other feature categories provide
surprisingly robust performance when the entire offender is known in terms of both
precision (0.89) and recall (0.78) using cross-validation.
• We then test our methods in the case where the network is exposed over time (by
virtue of new arrests) which mimics an operational situation. Though precision and
recall are reduced in this case, we show that our method significantly outperforms
the baseline approach currently in use by law-enforcement - on average increasing
precision and recall by more than two and three times respectively.
In addition to these main results, we also present some side results on the structure and
nature of the police dataset we examine. The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2
we motivate this difficult problem within the law-enforcement community. This is followed
by a description of our dataset along with technical notation in Section 2.3. There, we also
describe some interesting aspects of the gang arrest dataset and our co-arrestee network. In
Section 2.4 we formally define our problem, describe existing approaches, and then describe
the features we use in our approach. Then we present our results in Section 2.5 for both cases
where we assume the underlying network is known and when we discover the network over
time (mimicking an operational scenario). Finally, related work is discussed in Section 2.6.
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2.2 Background
A recent study shows that the network for gunshot victimization is denser than previously
believed [50]. According to the authors, within the city of Chicago over 70% of all gunshot
victims are contained within only 6% of the total population These findings validate what
has been considered common knowledge among police for decades: who you hang out with
matters, and if you hang out with those who engage in or are victims of violence you are
more likely to become an offender or victim yourself.
Identifying potential offenders of gun violence has also been a staple practice for
most law enforcement agencies as an attempt to curtail future victimization. When gang
conflicts get “hot,” it’s common for law enforcement agents to put together a list of known
“shooters”: those known gang members with an existing criminal history for gun violence
and a predilection for engaging in such illegal activity. Law enforcement agents then attempt
to make contact with these individuals with the expectation that such direct contact might
prevent violence. For most law enforcement agencies, however, this practice is performed in
a very ad-hoc manner. Identifying these individuals for intervention has relied primarily on
the ability of law enforcement agents to remember and identify at-risk individuals. While
feasible for small or discreet networks, the ability to recall multiple individuals in large
networks that cross large geographic regions and interact with multiple networks becomes
increasing difficult. This difficulty increases significantly as relationships between networks
change, known individuals leave the network, and new individuals enter it. In particular, the
practice is less than idea because it requires officers to attempt to recall criminal history and
network association data that varies between network members. For example, a subject who
has been arrested on multiple occasions for carrying a gun or has been arrested for shooting
another individual is easy to recall, but recalling and quantifying the risk for a subject with
multiple arrests for non-gun violence and a direct association with several offenders and
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victims of gun violence can be much more difficult. In short, identifying a known “shooter”
is relatively straightforward: they are known. The approach in this chapter synthesizes
network connectivity other attributes of the subject to identify those individuals at risk that
law enforcement might not yet know.
Using this information, law enforcement agents may not only more reliably and con-
sistently identify those individuals most likely to engage in acts of violence or become
victims of violence due to their personal associations with it, but also to more effectively
manage agency resources. Intervention strategies may include service providers outside law
enforcement, such as family members, social service providers, current or former educators,
and clergy. This diversity in approach not only delivers a more powerful “stop the violence”
message but provides a kind of force multiplier for law enforcement, increasing the number
of persons involved in the effort to prevent violence. Identifying specific individuals for
intervention also allows for a more targeted effort by law enforcement in terms of personnel
and geographic areas needing coverage. Blanketing violence reduction strategies that sat-
urate geographic areas with law enforcement agents and rely on direct contact with large
numbers of criminal network members are inefficient and resource consuming. Focusing
efforts on those individuals most likely to engage in violence allows law enforcement to
focus on smaller groups of people and smaller geographic areas (those areas within which
those individuals identified are known to frequent). Therefore, our approach can significantly
improve such efforts to identify violent individuals. In this chapter, we see how our method
not only out-performs the current social network heuristic used by police, but also that it
provides a much smaller and more precise list of potentially violent offenders than simply
listing those with a violent criminal record.
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2.3 Gang Co-offender Network
In this section, we introduce the necessary basic notation to describe our co-offender
network and then provide details of our real-world criminal dataset and study some of its
properties.
2.3.1 Technical Preliminaries
Throughout this chapter we shall represent an offender network as an undirected graph
G = (V,E) where the nodes correspond with previous offenders and an undirected edge
exists between offenders if they were arrested together. We will use τ to denote the set
of timepoints (dates). We also have three sets of labels for the nodes: V , S, gang which
are the sets of violent crimes, non violent crimes, and gangs. For each time point t and
each node v, the binary variable arrtv ∈ {true, false} denotes if v was arrested at time t
and distrtv, beat
t
v, gang
t
v to denote the district, beat, and gang affiliation of v at time t (we
will assume that time is fine-grain enough to ensure that at each time unit an individual is
arrested no more than once). If we drop the t superscript for these three symbols, it will
denote the most recent district, beat, and gang associated with v in the knowledgebase. We
shall use the sets V tv and Stv to denote the set of violent and non violent offenses committed
by v at time t respectively. Note if arrtv = false then V tv = ∅. We will drop the superscript t
for this symbol to denote the union of labels at any time t in the historical knowledgebase.
We also note that the edges in the graph also depend on time, but for sake of readability, we
shall state with words the duration of time considered for the edges.
For a given violent crime c ∈ V ∪ S , we will use the notation V tc = {v ∈ V s.t. c ∈ V tv}
(intuitively, the subset of the population who have committed crime c at time t). Again, we
will drop the superscript t if v could have committed crime c at any time in the historical
knowledgebase. For a set of labels C ⊆ V ∪ S, we will extend this notation: V tC = {v ∈
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V s.t. C ∩ V tv 6= ∅}. We will slightly abuse notation here: V t∅ = V . We will use similar
notation for denoting a subset of the population that are members of a certain gang. For
instance, Vgangv refers to the set of nodes who are in the same gang as node v. Likewise, we
shall use the same notation for subgraphs: GtC is the subgraph of G containing only nodes in
V tC and their adjacent edges. We will use the function d : V ×V → N to denote the distance
between two nodes - which for this chapter will be the number of links in the shortest path.
For a given node v, the set N iv = {v′ ∈ V s.t. d(v, v′) = i} – the set of nodes that are whose
shortest path is exactly i hops from v. For two nodes v, v′, we will use the notation σ(v, v′)
to be the number of shortest paths between v and v′. For nodes u, v, v′, σu(v, v′) will be the
number of shortest paths between v and v′ that pass through u.
For a given subgraph G′ of G, we shall use C(G′) to denote the largest connected
component of G′ and for node v ∈ G′, we will use the notation Cv(G′) to denote the
connected component of G′ to which v belongs. If we apply a community finding algorithm
to subgraph G′, we will use the notation Pv(G′) to denote the partition of G′ to which v
belongs. We will use the notation | · | to denote the size of a set or the number of nodes in a
subgraph.
2.3.2 Overview of Network Data
In this section, we describe our police dataset and the associated co-offender network as
well as some interesting characteristics that we have noticed.
Police Dataset. Our dataset consists of gang-related arrest incidents gathered from August
2011 - August 2014 in Chicago as well as their immediate associates. This data set includes
locations, dates, the links between the joint arrests, and the gang affiliation of the offenders.
In Table 2.1, we summarize some of the important characteristics of the dataset.
Violent Crimes. In our dataset, the set V consists of the following crimes have been iden-
tified by the Chicago Police as violent crimes: homicide (first or second degree murder),
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Table 2.1: Summary of Arrest Data
Name Value
Number of records 64466
Violent offense 4450
Homicide 312
Criminal sexual assault 153
Robbery 1959
Aggravated assault 1441
Aggravated battery 896
Non violent offense 60016
Table 2.2: Network Properties
Name Values
Vertices 9373
Edges 17197
Average degree 3.66
Average clustering 0.5
Transitivity 0.62
Connected components 1843
Largest connected component diameter 36
Largest connected component average path length 12.22
Largest connected component average clustering 0.63
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Fig. 2.1: The Gang Co-offender Network. Each Color Corresponds With a Different Gang.
criminal sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery. All aforemen-
tioned offenses are also FBI “index” crimes as well. A key aspect about the violent crimes
is that the dataset is highly imbalanced with much more arrests for non violent crimes vs.
arrests for violent crimes (60016 vs. 4450).
Network Properties. From the arrest data, we were able to construct the co-offender net-
work. In this network, the isolated vertices are eliminated due to the lack of structural
information. A visualization of the network is depicted in Fig. 2.1 and we have included
summary statistics in Table 2.2. In this network, we studied its degree distribution (Fig. 2.2).
Unlike the degree distribution for other scale free social networks, the degree distribution
for the offender network is exponential rather than power law. However, despite the degree
distribution being similar to that of a random (E-R) or small world network topology [82],
we noticed other characteristics that indicate differently. The co-offender network has a
much higher average clustering coefficient than in a random network and does not follow
the properties of the small world topology due to the relative high diameter and average
shortest path (computed for the largest connected component.)
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Fig. 2.2: Network Degree Distribution. The Exponential Function Fits to the Distribution
(R2 = 0.77).
Repeat Offenders. There are many instances of repeated offenses from the same offender.
Fig. 2.3 shows the distribution of the repeated arrests for each individual in the dataset. This
indicates that arrest records have utility in identifying future offenders.
0	  
1	  
2	  
3	  
4	  
5	  
6	  
2	   4	   6	   8	   10	   12	   14	   16	   18	   20	   22	   24	   26	   28	   31	   38	  
N
um
be
r	  o
f	  i
nd
iv
id
ua
ls
(T
ho
us
an
ds
	  )	  
Number	  of	  arrests	  
Fig. 2.3: Repeated Arrests. 12866 Instances of One-time Arrests Have Been Removed.
Seasonality of Crime. There is also a higher chance of criminal activities in different
months of the year. Fig. 2.4 demonstrates some of these variations. As per police ob-
servations, both violent and non-violent crime incidents are lower in the winter months
(Dec.-Feb.).
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2.4 Identifying Violent Offenders
In this section, we describe our problem, some of the existing practical approaches used
by law-enforcement, and our approach based on supervised learning with features primarily
generated by the network topology.
2.4.1 Problem Statement
Given a co-offender network, G = (V,E) and for each historical timepoint t ∈ τ =
{1, . . . , tmax} and v ∈ V , we have the values of arrtv, distrtv, beattv and elements of the sets
V tv, gangtv, we wish to identify set {v ∈ V s.t. ∃t > tmax where |V tv| > 0}. In other words,
we wish to find a set of offenders in our current co-offender network that commit a violent
crime in the future.
2.4.2 Existing Methods
Here we describe two common techniques often used by law-enforcement to predict
violent offenders. The first is a simple heuristic based on violent activities in the past. The
second is a heuristic that was based on the findings of [48] which was designed to locate
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future victims of violent crime. Both of these approaches are ad-hoc practical approaches
that have become “best practices” for predicting violent offenders. However, we are not
aware of any data-driven, formal evaluation of these methods in the literature.
Past Violent Activities (PVA). The first ad-hoc approach is quite simple: if an offender has
committed a violent crime in the past, we claim that he will commit a violent crime in the
future. An obvious variant of this approach is to return the set of violent offenders from the
last ∆t days. We note in practice, if police also have records of those who are incarcerated,
and such individuals would be removed from the list (due to the different jurisdictions of
police and corrections in the Chicago area, we did not have access to incarceration data -
however discussed re-arrests observed in the data in the previous section).
Two-Hop Heuristic (THH). The two-hop heuristic is based on the result of [48] which
investigated a social network of gunshot victims in Boston and found an inverse relationship
between the probability of being a gunshot victim and the shortest path distance on the
network to the nearest previous gunshot victim. Hence, THH returns all neighbors one and
two hops away from previous violent criminals (see Algorithm 1 for details on the version
we used in our experiments - which was the best-performing variant for our data). The
Chicago Police have adopted a variant of this method to identify potential gang victims using
a combination of arrest and victim data - the co-arrestee network of criminal gang members
includes many individuals who are also victims of violent crime (this is a direct result of
gang conflict). We note that victim information did not offer a significant improvement to
our approach, except the trivial case that a homicide victim cannot commit any crime in the
future.
2.4.3 Supervised Learning Approach
We evaluated many different supervised learning approaches including naive bayes (NB),
logistic regression (LR), decision tree (DT), random forest (RF), neural network (NN), and
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Algorithm 1 Two-Hop Heuristic
1: procedure TWOHOP(G) . Offender network G.
2: R← {} . Identified violent offenders.
3: V ICTIMS ← {u ∈ G|is homicide victim(u)}
4: for v ∈ V ICTIMS do
5: N ← N1v ∪N2v . Immediate neighbors
6: R← R ∪ {u ∈ N s.t. Vu = ∅}
7: return R
support vector machines (SVM) on the same set of features for the nodes in the network
that we shall describe in this section. We also explored combining these approaches with
techniques for imbalanced data such as SMOTE [16] and Borderline SMOTE [32], however
we do not report the results of Borderline SMOTE as it provided no significant difference
from SMOTE. We group our features into four categories: 1) neighborhood-based (having
to do with the immediate neighbors of a given node), 2) network-based (features that require
the consideration of more than a nodes immediate and nearby neighbors), 3) temporal
characteristics, and 4) geographic characteristics.
Neighborhood-Based Features
Neighborhood-based features are the features computed using each node and its first and/or
second level neighbors in G – often with respect to some C ⊆ V . The simplest such measure
is the degree of vertex v – corresponding to the number of offenders arrested with v. We can
easily extend this for some set of crimes of interest (C) where we look at all the neighbors
of v who have committed a crime in C. This generalizes degree (as that is the case where
C = ∅). In our experiments, we found the most useful neighborhood features to be in the
case where C = V though standard degree (C = ∅) was also used. We also found that using
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combinations of the following booleans based on the below definition also proved to be
useful:
majv(C, i) = |{u|u ∈ (∪iN iv) ∩ VC}| ≥ 0.5× |(∪iN iv)| (2.1)
Intuitively, majv(C, i) is true if at least half of the nodes within a network distance of i
from node v have committed a crime in C and false otherwise. Using these intuitions, we
explored the space of variants of these neighborhood-based features and list those we found
to be best-performing in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Neighborhood-based Features
Name Definition
Degree (w.r.t. C) |{u|u ∈ N1v ∩ VC}|
Fraction of 1-hop neighbors committing a
crime in C
|{u|u ∈ N1v ∩ VC}|/|N1v |
Fraction of 2-hop neighbors committing a
crime in C
|{u|u ∈ N2v ∩ VC}|/|N2v |
Majority of 1-hop and 2-hop neighbors
committing a crime in C
majv(C, 1) ∧majv(C, 2)
Minority of 1-hop and majority of 2-hop
neighbors comitting a crime in C
¬majv(C, 1) ∧majv(C, 2)
Network-Based Features
Network-based features fall into two sub-categories that we shall describe in this section:
community-based and path-based.
Network-based community features. We use several notions of a node’s community when
engineering features: the connected component to which a node belongs, the gang to which a
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Table 2.4: Network-based Features (Community)
Name Definition
Component size when v is
removed
|C(Cv(G) \ {v})|
Largest component size
with a violent node after v
is removed
maxv′∈C(Cv(G){v}∩VV |Xv′| where Xv′ = Cv′(Cv(G){v})
Group size |Pv(Ggangv)|
Relationships within the
group
|{(u, v) ∈ E s.t. u, v ∈ Pv(Ggangv)}|
Number of violent mem-
bers in the group
|{v′ ∈ Pv(Ggangv) s.t. Vv 6= ∅}|
Triangles in group Number of triangles within subgraph Pv(Ggangv)
Transitivity of group No. of triangles in Pv(Ggangv )No. of “∨”’s in Pv(Ggangv )
Group-to-group connec-
tions
|{u ∈ Pv(Ggangv) s.t. ∃(u,w) ∈ E where w /∈ Pv(Ggangv)}|
Gang-to-gang connec-
tions
|{u ∈ Ggangv s.t. ∃(u,w) ∈ E where w /∈ Ggangv}|
node belongs, and what we will refer to as an individual’s group. The connected component
is simply based on the overall network structure, while the gang is simply the subgraph
induced by the individuals in the network who belong to the same gang (the social network
of node v’s gang is denoted Ggangv . A nodes group is defined as the partition he/she belongs
to based on a partition of Ggangv found using the Louvain algorithm [25]. We found in
our previous work [51] and ensuing experience with the Chicago Police that the groups
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Table 2.5: Network-based Features (Path)
Name Definition
Betweenness (w.r.t. C)
∑
u,w∈VC
σv(u,w)
σ(u,w)
Closeness (w.r.t. C) (|VC | − 1)/
∑
u∈VC d(u, v)
Shell Number (w.r.t. C) shellC(v) (see appendix for details)
Propagation (w.r.t. C) 1 if v ∈ Γκ(VV), 0 otherwise. (see appendix for details)
produced in this method were highly relevant operationally. In this work, we also examined
other community finding methods (i.e. Infomap, and Spectral Clustering) and found we
obtained the best results by using the Louvain algorithm. We provide our best performing
network-based community features that we used in Table 2.4. Of particular interest, we
found for individual v that features relating to the size of the largest connected component
resulting v′ removal of his/her connected component was useful. Another interesting pair of
features we noted for both group and gang were the number of edges from members of that
group/gang to a different group or gang. We hypothesize that the utility of these features
is a result of conflicts between groups/gangs they are connected to as well as the spread
of violence amongst different groups (i.e. if two groups are closely connected, one may
conduct violent activities on behalf of the other).
Network-based path features. We looked at several features that leveraged the paths in
the network by adopting three common node metrics from the literature: betweenness,
closeness [26], and shell-number [63] as well as a propagation process based on a determin-
istic tipping model [30]. The features are listed in Table 2.5. We examined our modified
definitions of closeness, betweenness, and shell number where C was a single element of V ,
where C = V and where C = ∅ (which provides the standard definitions of these measures).
Our intuition was that individuals nearer in the network to other violent individuals would
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also tend to be more violent - and we found several interesting relationships such as that
for closeness (where C = VV) discussed in section 2.5.1 when we run the classifier on
each feature group. Shell number and the propagation process were used to capture the
idea of the spread of violence (as shell number was previously shown to correspond with
“spreaders” in various network epidemic models [37]). For the propagation process, we set
the threshold (κ) equal to two, three, four, five, and six. Further details on shell number and
the propogation process can be found in the appendix.
Geographic Features
Geographic features capture the information related to the location of a crime incident. The
intuition is that the individuals who commit crimes in violent districts are more likely to
become violent than the others. We found that the beat the individual has committed a
crime in is an important feature for our problem. This is in accordance with previous well
known literature in criminology [10, 57] which studies spatio-temporal modeling of criminal
behavior. The complete list is shown in Table 2.6.
Table 2.6: Geographic Features
Name Definition
District Frequency |{(t, v′) s.t. arrtv′ = true ∧ ∃t′ s.t. distrtv′ = distrt′v }|
Beat Frequency |{(t, v′) s.t. arrtv′ = true ∧ ∃t′ s.t. beattv′ = beatt′v }|
Beat Violence |{(t, v′) s.t. arrtv′ = true ∧ V tv′ 6= ∅ ∧ ∃t′ s.t. beattv′ = beatt′v }|
District Violence |{(t, v′) s.t. arrtv′ = true ∧ V tv′ 6= ∅ ∧ ∃t′ s.t. distrtv′ = distrt′v }|
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Temporal Features
We considered couple of temporal features: average interval month and number of violent
groups. Average interval time considers the average time duration of consecutive arrests of
the offender. The other feature, which we examine, is number of violent groups appeared
over time in the environment. We examined that the number of violent groups has been an
important temporal aspect for identifying the violent criminals. The key intuition here is, if
at least one member of the offender’s groups (formed over time) is violent then we consider
the offender as a part of that violent group. For an individual v, we define the partially
ordered set tvC = {t s.t. arrtv = true ∧ V tC 6= ∅} (intuitively the set of the time points where
v has committed at least on of the crimes in C.) We also define ∆vi (C) = t
v
i − tvi−1 for
each tvi ∈ tvC . Considering these definitions, we formally define the temporal features in
Table 2.7.
Table 2.7: Temporal Features
Name Definition
Average interval time (w.r.t. C)
∑
i ∆
v
i (C)/|tvC |
Number of violent groups
|{t s.t. arrtv = true ∧
∃v′ s.t. arrtv′ = true ∧
V tv 6= ∅ ∧
v′ ∈ N tv}|
2.5 Experimental Results
In this section, we review the results of our experiments. We looked at two types:
experiments where the entire co-offender network is known before-hand (Section 2.5.1)
and experiments where the network is discovered over time (Section 2.5.2). The intuition
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behind the experiments where the co-offender network is known is that the police often
have additional information to augment co-arrestee data. This information can include
informant reporting, observed individuals interacting by patrolmen, intelligence reporting,
and information discovered on social media and the Internet. In our second type of ex-
periment we discover the network over time in an effort to mimic real-world operations -
however, we also show that this makes the problem more difficult as it reduces the power of
neighborhood-based and network-based features. Based on our discussions with the Chicago
Police, we believe that real-world results will most likely fall somewhere between these
two experiments. Operationally, we will not have full arrest data, but the aforementioned
augmenting data sources are available (even though we did not have access to them for our
experiments).
2.5.1 Known Co-offender Network
In this experiment we assume that the entire offender network is known. In other words,
to compute the features for each vertex v, we assume that the set Vv is unknown while the
rest of the network is observable. In here we compared our approach with THH but not
with the PVA as we do not utilize time. In each of the experiments described in this section,
we conduct 10-fold cross validation. We consider the result of each approach as a set of
nodes that the approach considers to be a set of potentially violent individuals. Our primary
metrics are precision (fraction of reported violent individual who were actually violent in
the dataset), recall (fraction of violent individuals in the dataset reported by the approach),
F1 (the harmonic mean of precision and recall) and area under the curve. We conduct two
types of experiments: first, we study classification performance using only features within
a given category (neighborhood, network, temporal, and geographic), then we study the
classification performance when the entire feature set is used but with various different
classification algorithms and compare the result to THH.
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Classification using single feature categories. Here we describe classification results
using single feature categories. In this set of experiments, we use a random forest classifier
(which we will later show provides the best performance of the classifiers that we examined).
Fig. 2.5 shows the performance of RF for the described categories. The network-based
features are highly-correlated to violent behavior with average F1 value of 0.72 compared to
0.63 for neighborhood, 0.21 for geographic, and 0.03 for temporal features. In Fig. 2.6, we
show the performance of a feature from each category to classify violent vs. non violent
crimes; the performance of each example is a good indicator of the performance of its
category.
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Fig. 2.5: Precision, Recall, and F1 Comparison Between Each Group of Features.
Classification comparison. Table 2.8 shows the performance of different classification
algorithms. According to Table 2.8, RF provides the best performance (F1=0.83); we also
note that using SMOTE for RF, did not improve this result. Fig. 2.7 shows that our algorithm
outperforms THH. The performance of our features are also illustrated in Fig. 2.8. The area
under the curve (AUC) of applying all features is 0.98 – a higher overall accuracy. The
AUC for network-based, neighborhood-based, geographic, and temporal categories are 0.92,
0.91, 0.65, and 0.7 respectively. This indicates the importance of network features for this
classification task.
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(b) Network-based: Closeness (w.r.t. V)
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(c) Geographic: Beat Violence
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Fig. 2.6: Example Features from Each Category.
2.5.2 Co-offender Network Emerges over Time
In this section, we present a more difficult experiment - where the co-arrestee network
is discovered over time (by virtue of arrests). To simulate this phenomenon, we split our
data into two disjoint sets: the first set for learning and identification, and the second one for
measuring the performance. We do monthly split and start from February 2013. To illustrate
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Fig. 2.7: Performance Comparison Between THH and RF in K-fold Cross Validation.
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Fig. 2.8: ROC Curve for Each Feature Set.
the difficulty of this test, we show the number of nodes, edges, and violent individuals per
month in Fig. 2.9. We note that in the early months, we are missing much of the graphical
data (over 40% of nodes and edges in the first two months) - hence making many of our
features less effective. However, as the months progress, there are less violent individuals to
identify (due to the temporal nature of the dataset) - hence amplifying the data imbalance as
time progresses.
In these experiments, we compared our approach using random forests with the full
feature set to THH and PVA. We measure precision, recall, F1, number of true positives, and
number of false positives and display the results in Fig.s 2.10 and 2.11. In FRF (Filtered
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Table 2.8: K-fold Cross Validation
Method Precision Recall F1
RF 0.89 0.78 0.83
RF w. SMOTE 0.86 0.78 0.82
NB 0.45 0.49 0.47
LR 0.68 0.49 0.57
DT 0.71 0.66 0.68
NN 0.64 0.57 0.6
SVM 0.73 0.2 0.31
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Fig. 2.9: Number of Nodes, Edges, and Violent Individuals over Time. More Training Data,
Less Offenders to Identify.
Random Forest) we filter the offenders who have not committed any crime in the last 200
days. This simple heuristic increase the precision drastically while preserving the recall.
The main advantage of our method, besides the high precision, is its ability to significantly
reduce the population of potentially violent offenders when compared to PVA - which for
each month had between 1813 and 3571 false positives. Fig. 2.11 compares the number of
true and false positives instances for all the approaches for each month except PVA (PVA
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was omitted due to readability because of the large amount of false positives). While the
F1 measure for PVA is higher than that of the others, the large number of false positives
prevents the law enforcement from using it effectively in practice. Furthermore, as time
progresses, PVA likely rises in recall due to the drop in the number of violent criminals to
predict.
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Fig. 2.10: Performance of Different Approaches over Time
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Fig. 2.11: Number of True and False Positive Instances.
2.6 Related Work
Though we believe that the prediction of violent offenders using co-offender social
networks is new, there has previously been work on both co-offender networks in general as
well as crime forecasting. In this section, we briefly review some of the relevant contributions
in both of these areas.
There has been much previous work on co-offender networks. The earlier work that
studied these special social networks primarily came from the criminology literature. For
instance, [44] utilizes social network analysis techniques to study several case studies where
the social network of the criminal organization was known. In [42], the authors study the
stability of these networks change over time. More recently, graphical features derived from
networks comprised of both offenders and victims has been shown to be related to the the
probability of an individual becoming a victim of a violent crime [48, 50]. Previous work
has also looked at the relationship between network structure and geography [49] and has
leveraged both network and geographic features to predict criminal relationships [79] as
well as influence gang members to dis-enroll [70]. There have also been several software
tools developed for conducting a wide-range of analysis on co-offender networks including
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CrimeFighter [55], CrimeLink [62], and ORCA [51]. However, our work departs from this
is that we are looking to leverage the network topology and other features to identify violent
offenders - which was not studied in any of the previous work.
There has also been a large amount of work on crime forecasting (i.e. [28, 41]) though
historically, this work has relied on spatio-temporal modeling of criminal behavior [10, 57]
or was designed to identify suspects for specific crimes [80, 46]. None of this previous work
was designed to identify future violent offenders nor did it leverage social network structure.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we studied induction and deduction inferences, exploring the problem
of identifying repeat offenders who will commit a violent crime. We showed a strong
relationship between network-based features and whether a criminal will commit a violent
offense providing an unbiased F1 score of 0.83 in our cross-validation experiment where
we assumed that the underlying network was known. When we moved to the case where
the network was discovered over time, our method significantly outperformed baseline
approaches increasing precision and recall. In the next chapter, we study induction and
abduction inferences.
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Chapter 3
MISSING PERSON INTELLIGENCE SYNTHESIS TOOLKIT: A DATA-DRIVEN
GEOSPATIAL ABDUCTIVE REASONING
3.1 Introduction
There are approximately hundred thousands missing person cases each and every year
in the USA for the past twenty five years [14]. According to a review of missing and
unidentified persons cases in 2008 [43] most cases resolve within a few days or week;
however, there are instances that remain unsolved for decades or longer. In 2016, more
than 647K people went missing from which approximately 3K were not located at all [14].
According to National Crime Information Center report, 76% of the total entries in 2017 are
deceased [15].
The non-profit organization known as the Find Me Group (FMG), led by former law
enforcement professionals, is dedicated to solving or resolving these cases. The group
was founded by retired U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) Special Agent J.E. “Kelly”
Snyder in 2002 and consists of current and retired law enforcement officers with a wide-range
of investigative expertise, including but not limited to linguistics, handwriting analysis, body
language, missing person/homicide experience and search-and-rescue field management
skills. The FMG has trained experts/sources that provide detailed location information where
missing individuals can be found. Many of these experts have the ability to provide GPS
coordinates to locate missing persons with a varying level of success. Their commitment
and mission is to work collectively with law enforcement agencies to bring resolution to
unresolved disappearances and homicides. The FMG focus/goal is to provide accurate
location information in a timely manner and minimize the potential of finding the victim
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deceased. Thirty canine handlers certified in tracking, scent and cadaver complements the
FMG and has led to instances where the person in questions was located. This non-profit
operates with limited resources (e.g., manpower) - so it must use its volunteer assets in a
highly efficient manner.
This chapter introduces the Missing Person Intelligence Synthesis Toolkit (MIST)
which leverages a data-driven variant of geospatial abductive inference [74]. This system
takes search locations provided by a group of experts and rank-orders them based on the
probability assigned to areas based on the prior performance of the experts taken as a group.
We evaluate our approach compared to the current practices employed by the FMG and
found it significantly reduces the search area. In 29 cases examined in our experiments (on
real-world data provided by FMG), we found our approach to be able to reduce total search
area by a total of 53 square miles for standard searches and by 55 square miles when dog
team assets obtain a detection. This reduction is significant for the following reasons:
• Reduction in time to locate missing persons. In most of the cases, we achieved
reduction of 1 to 15 and 2 to 56 square miles in search areas 1×1 and 2×2 respectively.
As 3-5 square miles are searched on a typical day (terrain dependent), such a reduction
can potentially increase the chance of a missing person being found alive.
• Reduction in direct costs. During a search, FMG spends approximately $2200 per
day. In all tests, our approach reduced the search area in the majority of cases which
can be interpreted as a reduction in direct costs.
• Reduction in indirect costs. FMG relies extensively on volunteers to augment
searches. During searches, these individuals often lose earnings from their day job
or small business. As many volunteers also perform consulting or other services to
law enforcement, longer searches lead to loss of revenue and opportunity. In one
case, a volunteer estimated a loss of $15K. Again, our approach leads to a consistent
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Table 3.1: Summary of the Results. Number of Cases, Average Reduction (mi2) and
Total Reduction (mi2) in Search Area for the Two Approaches Considering Each Potential
Location Is Centered in Two Different Size of Blocks.
Name Block Size Cases Avg Reduction Reduction
Double distance integer
program (Section 3.6.1)
1× 1 23 2.3 53
2× 2 24 7.62 183
Consideration of dog team
detections (Section 3.6.2)
1× 1 26 2.12 55
2× 2 29 9.28 269
reduction in the search area - hence reducing these indirect costs.
Specifically, we contribute an extension to geospatial abduction [74] that leverages
historical data of individual experts. We also create new algorithms to learn the parameters
of a geospatial abduction model from data based on integer programming. We then evaluate
these algorithms on real-world data provided by the FMG under a variety of different settings.
This approach learns the pattern of each reporter independently and is able to overcome
outliers if any. It also performs well on limited data. Table 3.1 summarizes the results for
the two proposed approaches considering each potential location is centered in 1 × 1 or
2× 2 blocks.
We note that this research was done in collaboration with the FMG to ensure operational
relevance. As such is the case, we also briefly describe our user interface for MIST. MIST
needs a set of historical data including different cases and for each case, a set of potential
locations (GPS coordinates) associated with reporters to learn the pattern of reporters. Then
for any new case, it gets a set of potential locations and rank-orders them.
In this chapter, we formulate the problem of “finding missing person” with respect to
information provided by FMG’s experts, formally as a variant of the geospatial abduction
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problem (GAP) [72]. GAP refers to the detection of unobserved partner locations (in this
work, the location of a missing person) that best explain a set of observed phenomenon
with known geographic information. To account for the key nuances of “finding missing
person” problem though, we extended the GAP framework to better suit this domain. In
particular, we extend the GAP formalism with a data-driven model - accounting for the
previous performance of experts aiding in the missing person cases. We list the unique
characteristics of our framework here. Later in the next section, we provide our technical
approach to each.
1. Explanation Size. One key difference between “finding missing person” problem
and other GAP instances, is that our explanation (the result of a GAP inference
algorithm) only consists of a single related location (i.e., the location of the missing
person) corresponding to the phenomenon under study. This differs from returning
a set of k locations in the previously-introduced GAP formalisms. Consequently,
here, an explanation will consist of a single point, which in turn lead us to explore a
non-deterministic version of the original explanation.
2. Distance Constraints. In the original GAP formalism, each observed geospatial
phenomenon is related to unobserved “partner” points through a distance constraint
- (α,β) where α is the minimum distance between an observation and partner and
β is the maximum distance. As described, this pair of constraints was the same
for all observations. However, in the missing persons problem, each observation
corresponds to a different domain expert - and hence has a different (α,β) constraint
pair. Further, we study how this is best learned from data, as well as “soften” the
constraint - assigning a probability of the partner point being less than α, between
distances α and β, and greater than distance β from an observation.
3. Uncertainty. As we learn the (α,β) distance constraints for each observation and
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associate corresponding probabilities from historical data, it makes sense that the
inference step is treated probabilistically - which differs from the original deterministic
GAP framework. Further, this enables us to rank the potential partner locations (again,
as an explanation consists of one point, ranking search locations is more useful in a
practical sense).
4. Independent Observations. In the original GAP framework, independence amongst
the observations was not an assumption in the framework. However, FMG compart-
mentalizes the information from their law enforcement experts from one another in
a manner to obtain independent reporting. Hence, we make this assumption in this
chapter and it is supported by our experimental results.
We note there have been other data-driven approaches in the past for geospatial reasoning
based on a historical data (see our summary of this line of research in Section 3.7). However,
in general, these approaches rely on the sufficiently larger-sized corpus of training data as
compared with geospatial abduction-based methods. For instance, the average number of
cases reported on by an individual in our application is 3.66. It is 5.13 if we only consider the
reporters that have participated more than once. Moreover, if the missing person’s location
is not within a few miles of the reported locations, MIST is not able to locate the missing
person. This situation also cannot be handled by the FMG and is thus beyond the scope of
this chapter.
Currently, the FMG uses a simple heuristic to rank-order potential search locations for
a missing person (we describe this later in Section 3.4). Once ranked, FMG leverages a
variety of assets. Fig. 3.1 depicts a recently searched area for a case. It represents a screen
shot of the tracks from the GPS units that the dogs wear as well as the handheld units that
the searchers wear. This shows several dog tracks and the human tracks. The green, dark
blue, magenta represent three dogs, the grey and red represent two human searchers. The
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teal track is a trailing dog, ascertaining a direction of travel. The straight lines tend to be
humans and the rapidly changing direction lines are dogs as they grid around the humans.
Fig. 3.2 shows real-world examples of how the FMG practices in an undisclosed location.
Fig. 3.1: Screen Shot of the Tracks from the GPS Units.
(a) (b)
Fig. 3.2: (a) Picture of the Search Area Taken from the Plane. (b) Search Team.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we provide the technical
preliminaries. We discuss our data-driven extension in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, we detail
our algorithmic approach. We introduce our dataset and conduct data analysis in Section 3.5.
Next, we discuss the experimental results in Section 3.6. We review the related work in
Section 3.7. We conclude the chapter by presenting future research directions.
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3.2 Technical Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly explain geospatial abductive inference [74], and introduce
our new (introduced in this chapter) data-driven probabilistic extension. We show how this
extension was used to address the unique characteristics of the missing person location
problem.
In general, abduction or abductive inference refers to a type of logic or reasoning to derive
plausible explanations for a given set of facts [53]. Abduction has been extensively studied in
medicine [53, 54], fault diagnosis [19], belief revision [47], database updates [34, 20] and AI
planning [23]. Two major existing theories of abduction include logic-based abduction [24]
and set-covering abduction [12]. Though none of the above papers takes into account
spatial inference, [75] presents a logical formalism dealing with objects’ spatial occupancy,
while [61] describes the construction of a qualitative spatial reasoning system based on
sensor data from a mobile robot.
Geospatial abduction problem (GAP) [72], on the other hand, refers to the problem of
identifying unobserved partner locations (i.e., the location of a missing person) that best
explain a set of the observed phenomenon with known geographic locations. Geospatial
abduction was first introduced in [73] and later extended in [74, 71, 69, 68]. More formally,
each GAP consists of three major elements [72]: (1) observations: a set of observations
that explain the locations associated with the event under study (e.g., in this application,
the locations reported by the domain experts), (2) distance constraints: a pair (α, β) ∈ R
corresponding to lower and upper bounds on the distances between observation and partner
location and, (3) feasibility predicate: this allows to specify whether an area on the map is a
potential location for a partner.
Next, we present the notations and definitions used throughout the chapter, and review
the geospatial abduction framework of [72]. In the next section, we describe specialized
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extensions that were necessary to study our problem. First, without loss of generality,
we assume throughout the paper that a map (resp. space) is represented by a discrete
two-dimensional grid of size M ×N , defined as follows:
Definition 3.2.1. (Space). Given natural numbersM ,N , the space S is the set [1, . . . ,M ]×
[1, . . . , N ].
Associated with the space is a distance function d : S×S → R+ that satisfies the normal
distance axioms: d(pi, pi) = 0, d(pi, pj) = d(pj, pi), and d(pi, pj) ≤ d(pi, pq) + d(pq, pj).
Note that we use o to represent the observer (source of information) and po to represent
the location he/she reported (which differs slightly from the original framework). From these
observations (reports), the corresponding unobserved phenomenon is the actual location
of the missing person. In the original framework, the explanation consisted of geographic
locations that were located at least distance α and no more than distance β away from each
observation. In this work, we generalize this notion by providing α,β pair for each observer
- denoted αo,βo.
Definition 3.2.2. (Feasibility Function). A feasibility function feas is defined as feas :
S → {True,False}.
A key use for the feasibility function here is for an initial reduction of the search space
by the FMG. This is due to the fact that missing person reports often span a large area and an
initial reduction is necessary for practical reasons. For example, in this chapter, the distances
between found locations and last-seen locations are in range (0.026, 863.4) miles. Moreover,
the median is 2.7 miles which need the search area of 29 square miles. Also, according to
a report in UK [11], 66% of cases are within 5 miles of their home which is in an area of
about 78 square miles. Searching the whole area is thus impossible in practice due to the
resource limitation. An obvious future direction would be to utilize a probabilistic variant of
the feasibility function - which would assign a prior probability to a location for a missing
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person. However, in this application, it is unclear where such a distribution would come
from. Further, as the search space is relatively large when compared to FMG resources, the
deterministic version of this definition is more appropriate for operational reasons.
Due to the resource constraints and large areas for which reports are spread, FMG only
searches areas for which there is a report (i.e., potential locations for any missing person) by
its experts. As we will describe in Section 3.4, they search a 1× 1 mile square surrounding
a location reported by an observer. As such is the case, we shall assume the following
feasibility function throughout this chapter:
feas(p) =

True if p ∈ O
False otherwise
(3.1)
Unless otherwise noted, we shall assume the above function is used for feasibility and
hence the subset of the space considered will be the points in O.
We now provide the important definition of an explanation. Intuitively, for a given set of
points {p1, . . . , p|O|} reported by observers in O, an explanation is a set of points E such
that every point in this set is feasible and for every observation, there is a point in E that is
at least α units away from the observation, but no more than β units from the
Definition 3.2.3. ((α,β) Explanation). SupposeO is the set of observations, E is a finite set
of points in S , and 0 ≤ α, β ≤ 1 are two real numbers. E is said to be an (α, β) explanation
of O iff:
• p ∈ E implies that feas(p) = True, i.e., all points in E are feasible.
• (∀o ∈ O)(∃p ∈ E) α ≤ d(p, o) ≤ β, i.e., every observation is neither too close nor
too far from some point in E .
Thus, an (α,β) explanation is a set of points. Each point must be feasible and every
observation must have an analogous point in the explanation which is neither too close nor
too far.
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Again, we note that here an explanation will consist of a single point - the location of
the missing person (found location). Hence, this deterministic definition of an explanation
will not suffice - as in practice there will often not exist an explanation for a given problem
instance. As such is the case, we extended this framework using a data-driven approach.
3.3 Data-driven Extensions
Here, we describe our data-driven probabilistic extension to the original GAP formalism.
The framework extensions in this section were not previously introduced and are new in this
chapter. In order to do so, we first introduce some preliminary notation. For point p ∈ S , the
random variable Pp denotes that the missing person was found at point p, so this is either
true or false. We will use Pp as shorthand for Pp = True. For observer o ∈ O the random
variable Oo can be assigned to one of the points in p. Based on this notation, we define an
explanation distribution.
Definition 3.3.1 (Explanation Distribution). Given a set of observers O and a set of
reported locations by each observer p1, . . . , po, . . . , p|O|, an explanation distribution is a
probability distribution over all points in S - directly addressing characteristic 3 of this
application (see Section 3.1). This distribution assigns the probability of a missing person
being located at each point conditioned on the observers reporting their respective locations.
Formally, it is written as Pr(Pp|
∧
o∈OOo = po).
The key intuition is that if we are able to compute an explanation distribution, we can
then rank-order points in the space by probability - and hence conserve search resources.
Note that the explanation distribution is over all points - implying that there is precisely
one location. While generalizations that allow for more than one location are possible in
such a probabilistic framework, we keep the size at one due to the first characteristic of our
problem (as described in Section 3.1).
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In this chapter, we make an assumption of distance primacy meaning the distance
constraints (αo, βo) relate the Pp with
∧
o∈OOo = po. Hence, we introduce another random
variable, Rβop,p′ which is true if d(p, p
′) ≤ βo and false otherwise. Note that in the remainder
of this section, we will use one distance constraint (β) for sake of brevity - though this idea
can be extended for multiple distance constraints (as per characteristic 2 from Section 3.1).
In fact, we leverage multiple distance constraints in our optimization procedure for parameter
selection introduced later. Hence, by distance primacy, we have the following relationships.
Pr(Pp|
∧
o∈O
Oo = po) = Pr(Pp|
∧
o∈O
Rβp,po) (3.2)
According to the Bayes’ Theorem, this is equivalent to the following.
Pr(Pp)× Pr(
∧
o∈OR
β
p,po|Pp)
Pr(
∧
o∈OR
β
p,po)
(3.3)
However, by characteristic 4, we assume that the observers report information indepen-
dently (conditioned on the location where the missing person is actually located), which
gives us the following.
Pr(Pp)×
∏
o∈O Pr(R
β
p,po|Pp)
Pr(
∧
o∈OR
β
p,po)
(3.4)
Due to our application, we will not consider the prior probability Pr(Pp) as each
missing person case occurs in a different geographic location - and due to the wide range
of cases that span multiple countries, data supporting a realistic, informed prior is highly
sparse. As such, we will treat this prior probability as a uniform distribution over all
locations. Further, for notational simplicity, we shall use the notation ρβo for the quantity
Pr(Rβp,po = True|Pp = True). Therefore, we can rank points in the space based on the
explanation distribution by simply considering their log-likelihood computed as follows:
∑
o∈O
d(p,po)≤β
log(ρβo ) +
∑
o∈O
d(p,po)>β
log(1− ρβo ) (3.5)
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Hence, the inference step for this problem is straight-forward provided we know the
values β and ρβo for each observer o ∈ O (or similar parameters if considering more than
one distance constraint). If we know the value β we can then compute ρβo based on a corpus
of historical data concerning the accuracy of reporter o. Given a corpus of previous cases for
the observer Co where the found location was pc and the location reported by the observer
was pco, we can compute ρ
β
o as follows:
ρβo =
|{c ∈ Co s.t. d(pc, pco) ≤ β}|
|Co| (3.6)
Hence, we also adjust ρβo to account for volume of the reporter’s history to provide the
effect of regularization. Note that the quantity |Co| will be small for reporters with a limited
case history. Considering ηo as the portion of total number of cases in which observer o has
participated, to the total number of cases, and  as a non-negative parameter, we define ρβ,o
as follows:
ρβ,o = ρ
β
o − × (1− ηo) (3.7)
The situation is further complicated with multiple distance constraints. We propose an
optimization approach to this problem in the next section.
3.4 Algorithmic Approach
In this section, we present our algorithmic approach to special case of geospatial abduc-
tive inference. First, we explain the method that FMG currently uses. Then, we provide our
proposed optimization approach to solve the problem.
3.4.1 Existing Method
The FMG uses the following method to explore the missing person location. Given the
reported locations provided by different observers, FMG initially creates a search area (grid)
as follows. First, they draw building blocks (or boxes) of size 1×1 mile centered at each
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reported location (note that depending on the situation, these boxes may overlap). Then,
they search the entire grid in the following order. First, they search the larger areas which
are created of the overlapping boxes, and if the missing person was not found, they explore
the remaining boxes in the order of the observers’ history (how well they did in the past).
The whole process is repeated by extending the size of boxes to 2×2 miles, if the missing
person was not located. Note that, we use the same grid in our proposed methods.
3.4.2 Proposed Methods
As described, for simplicity, we first elaborate on the required steps to calculate the
best βo for each observer. Then, we extend the idea for multiple distance constraints. Let
[βo] be the set of possible error radii. Note that for Co cases where observer reported a
location, there are at most |Co| possible values for βo. Hence, our goal is to select as a set of
these distance constraints - one for each observer. We do this through an integer program -
where for each observer o ∈ O and each associated distance constraint βo ∈ [βo] we have an
indicator variable Xo,βo that is 1 if we use that value and zero otherwise. We shall refer to
this as the single distance integer program. Hence, we find an assignment of values to these
indicator variables in order to maximize the following quantity:
F1 =
∑
c∈C
∑
o∈O
∑
β∈[βo]
[
δβ(p
c, pco)× log ρβo ×Xo,β+
(1− δβ(pc, pco))× log(1− ρβo )×Xo,β
]
(3.8)
subject to the following constraints:
∀Xo,β ∈ {0, 1} (3.9)
∀o,
∑
β∈[βo]
Xo,β ≤ 1 (3.10)
∑
o
∑
β∈[βo]
Xo,β = k (3.11)
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where k is a cardinality that limits the number of reporters (which is set to a natural number
in the range 1, . . . , |O|), and δβ(x, y) is defined as:
δβ(x, y) =

1 if d(x, y) ≤ β
0 if d(x, y) > β
(3.12)
However, this equation will result in tendency toward selecting the largest distance
constraints. This has the effect of not only maximizing the probability of the locations
where the missing person was found, but also can increase the probability of other locations.
Intuitively, we want to also minimize the following quantity:
F2 =
∑
c∈C
∑
o∈O
∑
p∈{S\pc}
∑
β∈[βo]
[
δβ(p, p
c
o)× log ρ
′β
o ×Xo,β+
(1− δβ(p, pco))× log(1− ρ
′β
o )×Xo,β
]
(3.13)
Therefore, the objective function we seek to optimize is
L1 = max(F1 − F2) (3.14)
Theorem 3.4.1. Number of variables in single distance integer program is O(avg(|Co|) ·
|O|).
Proof. For any o ∈ O, there are at most |Co| possible distance constraints. Considering
avg(|Co|) as average number of cases reported by each reporter, the total number of
variables is O(avgo(|Co|) · |O|).
We extend the previous formulation by allowing the objective function to find a pair of
distance constraints for each reporter. We have experimentally found diminishing returns
on performance (and in many cases increased complexity) with more than two constraints.
42
This will give us the double distance integer program as follows:
F ′1 =
∑
c∈C
∑
o∈O
∑
α∈[βo]
∑
β∈[βo]
β≥α
[
δα(p
c, pco)× log ρα,o ×Xo,α,β+
(
1− δα(pc, pco)
)
× δβ(pc, pco)× log
(
ρβ,o − ρα,o
)
×Xo,α,β+
(1− δβ(pc, pco))× log
(
1− ρβ,o
)
×Xo,α,β
]
subject to the following constraints:
∀Xo,α,β ∈ {0, 1}
∀o,
∑
α,β∈[βo]
Xo,α,β ≤ 1
Note that we have limited the selection of α for ρα,o > 0.5 due to high confident distance
selection. Likewise, we use the following objective function, to avoid bias toward selecting
the largest β’s.
L2 = max(F
′
1 − F ′2) (3.15)
where F ′2 is defined as follows:
F ′2 =
∑
c∈C
∑
o∈O
∑
α∈[βo]
∑
β∈[βo]
β≥α
[ ∑
p∈{S\pc}
δα(p, p
c
o)× log ρ
′α,
o ×Xo,α,β+
(
1− δα(p, pco)
)
× δβ(p, pco)× log(ρ
′β,
o − ρ
′α,
o )×Xo,α,β+(
1− δβ(p, pco)
)
× log
(
1− ρ′β,o
)
×Xo,α,β
]
(3.16)
Theorem 3.4.2. Number of variables in double distance integer program is O(avg(|Co|)2 ·
|O|).
Proof. For any o ∈ O, there are at most |Co|(|Co|−1)/2 possible distance constraints while
choosing at most two. Considering avg(|Co|) as average number of cases reported by each
reporter, the total number of variables is O(avgo(|Co|)2 · |O|).
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While we obtained a significant reduction in the area searched by setting the cardinality
constraint k = O, we found that varying it would often lead to further improvement. We
gradually increased the number of observers from one to the total number of observers and
each time, we learned the distance constraints for the last added observers. In this method
of optimization, we may choose a specific number of points in each iteration. The number
of points added with each iteration can be determined based on available resources.
We also defined two heuristic to discriminate points with the same probability. In each
iteration, we chose the point with highest probability. If there were more than one point, we
applied the following heuristics: (1) we chose the point which had the maximum summation
of the priors of the reporters in its 1× 1 mile. (2) we chose the points which had the most of
the reported locations by the reporters, in its 1× 1 mile.
Algorithm 2 is a specific variant of restricted model. In this algorithm, in each iteration
one point (i.e., representative of a 1 × 1 mile) is selected. Though we note that this can
easily be adjusted in practice. If the area size we are able to search is larger than number
of observers, we sort the representatives based on their probabilities. Then, we apply two
heuristics to rank them (similar to Lines 11-19 ). To better understand how Algorithm 2
works, we will give an example next.
Example 3.4.1. A 5×6 search grid with four observers is shown in Fig. 3.3. The description
of each subfigure is as follows: (a) Given the observations o1 = (2, 2), o2 = (3, 4),
o3 = (5, 2), and o4 = (6, 5), we would like to pick top 5 locations to search. (b) In the first
iteration, best observer and its β is selected by Algorithm 2. Here, o2 is picked and each
cell is ranked based on that. Thus, (3, 4) is ranked first. (c) In the next iteration, the second
top observer is selected (o3) as shown in red. Therefore, cells are prioritized based on the
two observers o2 and o3. The cell (4, 3) is picked as the second search point. (d) In the third
iteration, o1 is picked and the cell (3, 3) is selected as the next searching point. (e) In the
fourth iteration, all reporters play role in prioritizing the locations and the point (4, 2) is
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Algorithm 2 Iterative Search Resource Allocation
1: procedure OPT-POINT-BY-POINT(A, c, S, ρ) . Train set A, Test case c
2: List R = ∅ . Output
3: for k ∈ [1, |Oc|] do . k is a constant value of the constraint
4: Find assignment of variables that optimize (3.15) w.r.t. (3.9 - 3.11)
5: RP ← Order by (3.5) . Ranked points RP
6: RP ← RP \R
7: Pick P ⊆ RP with largest probabilities
8: if P includes one point then
9: R = R ∪ P
10: else
11: p← Heuristic(P )
12: R = R ∪ {p}
13: return R
picked. (f) In the last iteration, since there is no more observers to add, the next cell with
highest probability is selected.
Theorem 3.4.3. The time complexity of the algorithm (2) is O(avg(|CO|) · avg(|Oc|)3 ·
avg(|Co|)2).
Proof. Running objective function Eq (3.15) takes O(avg(|CO|) · avg(|Oc|) · avg(|Co|)2 ·
avg(|S|)) time where CO is the set of cases that includes at least one of the observers from
the test case. Space size is O(avg(|Co|)); therefore, the objective function run time can be
simplified to O(avg(|CO|) · avg(|Oc|)2 · avg(|Co|)2). Line 5 also takes O(avg(|Co|)2) and
the running time of the remainder is O(avg(|Oc|)2). It is limited by |Oc| for loop in line 3.
Hence, the running time is O(avg(|CO|) · avg(|Oc|)3 · avg(|Co|)2).
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Fig. 3.3: A Toy Example Demonstrating How Algorithm 2 Works. Orange Cells Represent
the Observations (Reported Locations) by the Observers (Reporters). Red Cells Represent
the Observations That Are Picked by Our Algorithm and Numbers Depict the Corresponding
Prioritized Cells to Search.
3.5 Missing Person Dataset
In this section, we describe our dataset and briefly discuss the observation made from
our initial data analysis.
3.5.1 Overview
Our dataset includes cases (i.e., missing persons), found status (alive/deceased), found
location (latitude and longitude), age and reason for disappearance as well as the potential
locations (latitude and longitude) associated with the reporters/experts. Note we assume that
the reporters/experts have considered all different aspects of the missing person including
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age, gender, potential reason and health condition. Therefore, potential locations reflect
different existing limitations for a given case. The description of this dataset is summarized
in Fig. 3.4. About 86% of the FMG cases found deceased. Note that in some cases, we
are aware of reports, but do not have the found location (pco). In this work, we only have
29 cases with the known found locations used for the experiments. However, for the data
analysis, the entire dataset is applied.
Fig. 3.4: Description of the Dataset
3.5.2 Data Analysis
The dataset consists of cases distributed all over the world. We split the U.S.-based cases
into 4 regions, west, midwest, northeast and south, according to the United States Census
Bureau. We further grouped together all cities outside the U.S. into one single category,
namely, international. The distribution of cases across different regions is demonstrated in
Fig. 3.5. As it is shown in the Fig., the west is dominated by Arizona and California, due to
the large focus of FMG on these two states.
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There are several known reasons of disappearance associated with the cases in our
dataset including, accidental, bipolar, drowning, foul play, natural, runaway, self-inflicted,
staged and undetermined. According to Fig. 3.6, ‘foul play’ is the dominant reason for
disappearance. There are also different number of reporters for each case. The distribution
of reporters with respect to the number of cases in which they participated is shown in
Fig. 3.7a.
(a) (b)
Fig. 3.5: Distribution of the Cases Across Different Regions of the US and International.
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Fig. 3.6: Distribution of the Cases with Respect to the Probable Reasons.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 3.7: a. Distribution of Frequency of Participation. b. Distribution of All Reporters with
Respect to Their Confidence Values.
For the rest of our data analysis, we need to introduce some preliminary notation. We
use the random variable gA to denote if the missing person is found alive or not, so it is
either true or false. We shall use Pr(gA = True|o stated Alive) to denote the confidence of
the observer o in reporting Alive. This confidence value shows the portion of the cases for
which o has reported the missing person is Alive and the person was found Alive, to the total
number of cases for which o has reported Alive. Likewise, we compute the confidence of
o in reporting Deceased. The distribution of the reporters with respect to their confidence
values is demonstrated in Fig. 3.7b. According to the Fig., most reporters’ confidence values
belong to the ranges of [0.3,0.4) for alive and [0.8,0.9) for deceased statuses.
We also define the ratio rA as follows:
rA =
Pr(gA = True|observer o stated Alive)
Pr(gA = True)
(3.17)
This ratio demonstrates how much the observer o outperformed the prior probability
Pr(gA = True) on Alive. Similarly, we use rD for Deceased cases. The distributions of the
reporters with respect to rA and rD are shown in Fig. 3.8. We note that as most are found
dead, it is harder for the reporters to outperform the prior on Deceased compared to the
Alive.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 3.8: The Distributions of the Reporters with Respect to rA and rD.
3.6 Experimental Results
This section reports on the experiments conducted to validate our approach. We note that
the individual cases themselves are not related - hence we are justified in using leave-one-out
cross validation in our experiments. Specifically, for each case in the experiments, we learn
a different model using all of the other cases. We first compare the methods for restricted
(without dog) and unrestricted (with dog) searches and then discuss the sensitivity of the
parameter.
3.6.1 Area Reduction
In this section, we examine how our approach can be used to reduce the area searched
by the Find Me Group (FMG) over the baseline. Note that we use the same search grid
for both approaches (double distance integer program with Algorithm 1 and  = 0.05) and
the baseline (described in Section 3.4.1). The difference is the strategy for searching the
grid. The FMG strategy is to find the overlaps between the reported locations and divide the
search grid to the contiguous areas. The larger the size of each area is, the higher priority it
gains during search. Fig. 3.9 shows the reduction of area based on our approach (double
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distance integer program with Algorithm 1 and  = 0.05) when compared to the baseline.
We examine this with grid squares of 1×1 miles and 2×2 miles. In grid squares of 1×1
miles, the missing person was located for 23 cases. Our approach achieved area reduction in
15 cases - reducing the search area by 3.8 square miles on average. In the 2 cases where our
method caused the search area to increase, the increase was by 2 square miles on average.
This contrasts with the cases where the area was reduced - reducing the search area by up
to 15 square miles. For the 23 cases, the average and total reduction was 2.3 and 53 mile
square respectively (t(23) = 1.93, p < 0.03). We also calculated the probability of locating
missing person by searching the same size of areas randomly in Fig. 3.10. The average
probability of our approach and baseline are 0.23 and 0.44 respectively (see Fig. 3.10a).
We also examined cases where the size of the grid squares was 2×2 miles. In the 24
cases, the area reduction achieved was in 19 cases using our method, and by an average
equals to 11.21 square miles. Further, in the 4 cases, our method caused an increase
in the search area, however, the increase was 7.5 square miles on average. Our method
outperformed the baseline in area reduction with an average and total of 7.62 and 183 mile
square, respectively (t(24) = 1.88, p < 0.03). The average probabilities of locating missing
person while searching the same size of areas randomly are 0.23 and 0.42 of our approach
and baseline, respectively (see Fig. 3.10b).
3.6.2 Consideration of Dog Team Detections
The experiments in the previous section illustrated how our approach could reduce the
search area over the baseline for standard grid settings. However, in the events that a dog
team detects evidence of the missing person, it may lead to a continued search outside of
the assigned grid square. These searches can lead to FMG personnel examining up to a
mile outside a designated location. In this section, we consider a grid square settings in the
last section, but also allow for an additional mile outside the square to mimic the effect of
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Fig. 3.9: Searched Area until the Missing Person Is Located (Baseline and Algorithm 1).
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Fig. 3.10: Probability of Locating Missing Person for the Searched Area Demonstrated in
Fig. 3.9.
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Fig. 3.11: Searched Area with Dogs Allowed to Explore 1 Mile Beyond the Grid (Baseline
and Algorithm 1).
the dog search team following such a lead. Fig. 3.11 demonstrates the reduction of area
based on our approach (double distance integer program with Algorithm 1 and  = 0.05)
when compared to the baseline. We investigate the area reduction with grid squares of 1×1
miles and 2×2 miles. According to Fig. 3.11a, in the 26 cases where the missing person
was located, our approach achieved area reduction in 16 cases - reducing the search area by
3.625 square miles on average. In the 2 cases where our method caused the search area to
increase, the increase was only 1.5 square miles on average. This contrasts with the cases
where the area was reduced - reducing the search area by up to 15 square miles. Our method
outperformed the baseline in area reduction with an average and total of of 2.12 and 55
mile square (t(26) = 2.06, p < 0.02). We also calculated the probability of locating missing
person by searching the same size of areas randomly in Fig. 3.12. The average probability
for our approach and baseline is 0.18 and 0.42, respectively (see Fig. 3.12a).
We examined cases where the size of the grid squares was 2×2 miles. In the 29 cases,
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Fig. 3.12: Probability of Locating Missing Person for the Searched Area Demonstrated in
Fig. 3.11. Dogs Are Allowed to Explore 1 Mile Beyond the Grid (Algorithm 1).
the area reduction achieved by our method was in 25 cases, and on average by 11.68 square
miles. In the 4 cases where our method caused the search area to increase, the increase was
5.75 square miles on average. This contrasts with the cases with the reduced search area
by up to 56 square miles. Our method outperformed the baseline in area reduction with
an average and total of 9.28 and 269 mile square (t(29) = 2.7, p < 0.005). The average
probabilities of locating missing person while searching the same size of areas randomly are
0.18 and 0.42 for our approach and baseline respectively as it is shown in Fig. 3.12b.
We also compared the results in Fig. 3.9 and 3.11. In both search area sizes (1×1 and
2×2 miles), Algorithm 1 searches the smaller area and is ahead of the baseline as it is shown
in Fig. 3.13.
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Fig. 3.13: Comparison of Searched Area over All Cases in Both Area Reduction (AR) and
Consideration of Dog Team Detection (DTD) Using Algorithm 1 and the Baseline.
3.6.3 Parameter Sensitivity
We compare different values of  in both double distance integer programs (iterative
search resource allocation and non-iterative program). The impact of changing the parameter
 is shown in Fig. 3.14. We plot the fraction of area searched by our method over the
baseline, against the , for both grid sizes of 1× 1 and 2× 2. We note that while the extreme
values of  (i.e. 0.0 and 0.20) negatively effected the performance of both approaches, we
achieved relatively stable results for intermediate values - noting that the best performance
was for  equal to 0.05 - which we used in the experiments.
We also studied the performance of our optimization approach without algorithm 1 (i.e.
prioritize locations by equation 5 after selecting the values for βo through optimization
of 19 with regards to Lines 9-11). The results are depicted in Fig. 3.15. The behavior of
the algorithm for different settings of  were similar to that found with Algorithm 1, the
reduction in search area was generally less.
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Fig. 3.14: Fraction of Total Area Searched Across All Cases with the Iterative Search
Resource Allocation Approach over the Baseline.
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vation Not Using Algorithm 1
Fig. 3.15: Fraction of Total Area Searched Across All Cases by the Double Distance Integer
Programming Approach (Not Using Algorithm 1) over the Baseline.
56
Fig. 3.16: The MIST User Interface.
3.6.4 User Interface
We have created a user interface using the TKinter library and provided Google map and
Google earth visualizations in HTML and KML formats. As displayed in Fig. 3.16, users
can easily use the interface to run new missing person cases using case information and
reporters historical data. Fig. 3.17 shows an example of the input and outout visualization
by MIST. At the time of this writing, we have provided results of MIST to support an active
case with FMG. FMG found the result consistent with their experiences.
3.7 Related Work
Recently, there has been some work [68, 69, 71, 73, 39] addressing geospatial abductive
inference which was first introduced in [74]. In [68] for example, authors studied the case
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(a) Observations (b) Ordered Search Areas
Fig. 3.17: An Example of Input (a) and Output (b) by MIST.
of geospatial abduction where there is an explicit adversary who is interested in ensuring
that the agent does not detect the partner locations in an attempt to simulating the real-world
scenario of insurgents who conduct IED (improvised explosive device) attacks. Another
work [69], has adopted geospatial abduction to develop a software tool which applies
geospatial abduction to the environment of Afghanistan, to look for insurgent high-value
targets, supporting insurgent operations. The work of [71] introduced a variant of the GAPs
called region-based GAPs (RGAPs) which deals with the multiple possible definitions
of the subregions of the map. Finally, spatial cultural abductive reasoning engine which
solves spatial abductive problems was developed in [73]. Aside from introducing GAP, the
work of [74] demonstrated the accuracy of proposed framework on a real-world dataset
of insurgent IED attacks against US forces in Iraq. Further, the work of [39] proposed a
technique to reduce the computational cost of point-based GAPs. They presented an exact
algorithm for the natural optimization problem of point-based GAPs. Geospatial abduction
problems are related to facility location [76] and sensor placement problems [40] in that
they identify a set of geo-locations to optimize a cost or reward function. However, there are
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key differences amongst these various frameworks that arise from the difference between
explanation and optimization. Interested readers can refer to [72] for further discussion on
this topic.
Similarly, [2] presents a specific aspect of the well-known qualification problem, namely
spatial qualitative reasoning approach, which aims at investigating the possibility of an agent
being present at a specific location at a certain time to carry out an action or participate in an
event, given its known antecedents. This work is different from both above papers and our
study, as it takes on purely logical approach to formalizing spatial qualifications, while our
work and other aforementioned studies use geometric and probabilistic techniques. Further,
the framework of this chapter is tailored specifically for the missing person problem.
Looking beyond geospatial abduction, recent research has demonstrated that GPS (po-
sitional) data could be used to learn rich models of human activity [58, 59, 60, 27]. For
example, [58, 59, 60], modeled the human interactions and intentions in a fully relational
multi-agent setting. They used raw GPS data from a real-world game of capture the flag and
Markov logic- a statistical-relational language. Whereas [27] developed a model to simulate
the behaviors associated with insurgent attacks, and their relationship with geographic
locations and temporal windows.
At first glance, one may think our work is similar to [40], in that they identify a set
of geo-locations to optimize a cost or reward function. However, as described, there are
key differences amongst these various frameworks that arise from the difference between
explanation and optimization.
Finally, compared to the conference version [65], the experiments are entirely revised
and new experiments are also conducted. A new heuristic used to enhance our algorithmic
approach. The number of cases in the experimental results has been increased. More details
on the dataset is also provided.
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3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we studied induction and abduction inferences and introduced the
Missing Person Intelligence Synthesis Toolkit (MIST) which leverages a data-driven variant
of geospatial abductive inference. MIST can rank-order the set of search locations provided
by a group of experts. The experimental results showed that our approach is able to reduce
the total search area by a total of 53 square miles for standard searched and by 55 square
miles when dog team assets obtain a detection. This reduction will make FMG locating
missing persons faster while saving in direct and indirect cost. At the time of writing this
manuscript, FMG has started to use MIST to support 2 missing-persons cases.
This work can be extended in several directions including utilizing a probabilistic
variant of the feasibility function, incorporating other features such as missing person’s
corresponding region, age, gender into the model. In next chapter, we aim to use these
reasoning approaches to identify pathogenic social media accounts.
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Chapter 4
UNSUPERVISED FRAMEWORK TO DETECT PATHOGENIC SOCIAL MEDIA
ACCOUNTS
4.1 Introduction
The spread of harmful mis-information in social media is a pressing problem. We refer
accounts that have the capability of spreading such information to viral proportions as
“Pathogenic Social Media” (PSM) accounts. These accounts include terrorist supporters
accounts, water armies, and fake news writers. These organized groups/accounts spread
messages regarding certain topics. They might be multiple people that tweet/retweet through
multiple accounts to promote/degrade an idea. This can influence public opinion. Identifying
PSM accounts has important applications to countering extremism [36, 4], the detection of
water armies [18, 17, 81] and fake news campaigns [31, 35, 4]. In Twitter, many of these
accounts are social bots.
The PSM accounts that propagate information are key to a malicious information
campaign and detecting them is critical to understanding and stopping such campaigns.
However, this is difficult in practice. Existing methods rely on message content [45], network
structure [13] or a combination of both [77, 21, 22]. However, reliance on information
of this type leads to two challenges. First, network structure is not always available. For
example, the Facebook API does not make this information available without permission
of the users (which is likely a non-starter for PSM accounts). Second, the use of content
often necessitates the training of a new model for a previously unobserved topics. For
example, PSM accounts taking part in elections in the U.S. and Europe will likely leverage
different types of content. In this chapter, we propose a method based on causal analysis to
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avoid these very problems. The main requirement is an activity log of user’s activities and
timestamp. Further, as our method does not rely on data used in previous approaches, it is
inherently complementary – which allows for future combined methods.
In this chapter, we aim to find PSM users in the viral cascades. As viral cascades are
so rare, the users that cause them are suspicious accounts. To address these issues, we
leverage causal analysis [78, 38]. We developed, implemented, and evaluated a framework
for identifying PSM accounts. This chapter makes the following contributions:
• We proposed a PSM detection framework that does not leverage network structure,
cascade path information, content and user’s information.
• We observed that PSM accounts have higher causality values.
• We introduced a series of causality-based metrics for identifying PSM users - which
alone can achieve precision of 0.66.
• We introduced an unsupervised label propagation framework that, when combined
with our causal metrics, provide a precision of 0.75. We showed that our framework
significantly outperforms random method (0.11), the content-based bot detection
(0.13), all features (0.16), and Sentimetrix [77] (0.11).
• Our framework is able to find the more important PSM accounts in comparison with
the baseline methods. The larger the cascade is, the more important its PSM accounts
are and our model can capture those cascades better.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we describe our framework
that leverages causal analysis and label propagation. Then we present the algorithms in
Section 4.3. This is followed by a description of our dataset in Section 4.4. In Section 4.5,
the causality analysis is discussed. Then we describe our implementation and discuss our
results in Section 4.6. Finally, related work is reviewed in Section 4.7.
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4.2 Technical Approach
4.2.1 Technical Preliminaries
Throughout this chapter we shall represent cascades as an “action log” (Actions) of
tuples where each tuple (u,m, t) ∈ Actions corresponds with a user u ∈ U posting message
m ∈ M at time t ∈ T , following the convention of [29]. We assume that set M includes
posts/repost of a certain original tweet or message. For a given message, we only consider
the first occurrence of each user. We define Actionsm as a subset of Actions for a specific
message m. Formally, we define it as Actionsm = {(u′,m′, t′) ∈ Actions s.t. m′ = m}.
Definition 4.2.1. (m-participant). For a given m ∈M , user u is an m-participant if there
exists t such that (u,m, t) ∈ Actions.
Note that the users posting tweet/retweet in the early stage of cascades are the most
important ones since they play a significant role in advertising the message and making
it viral. For a given m ∈ M , we say m-participant i “precedes” m-participant j if there
exists t < t′ where (i,m, t), (j,m, t′) ∈ Actions. Thus, we define key users as a set of
users adopting a message in the early stage of its life span. We formally define key user as
follows:
Definition 4.2.2. (Key User). For a given message m, m-participant i, and Actionsm, we
say user i is a key user iff user i precedes at least φ fraction of m-participants (formally:
|Actionsm| × φ ≤ |{j|∃t′ : (j,m, t′) ∈ Actionsm ∧ t′ > t}|, (i,m, t) ∈ Actionsm),
where φ ∈ (0, 1).
The notation | · | denotes the cardinality of a set. All messages are not equally important.
That is, only a small portion of them gets popular. We define viral messages as follows:
Definition 4.2.3. (Viral Messages). For a given threshold θ, we say that a message m ∈M
is viral iff |Actionsm| ≥ θ. We use Mvir to denote the set of viral messages.
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The Definition 4.2.3 allows us to compute the prior probability of a message (cascade)
going viral as follows:
ρ =
|Mvir|
|M | (4.1)
We also define the probability of a cascade m going viral given some user i was involved
as:
pm|i =
|{m ∈Mvir s.t. i is a key user}|
|{m ∈M s.t. i is a key user}| (4.2)
We are also concerned with two other measures. First, the probability that two users i
and j tweet or retweet viral post m chronologically, and both are key users. In other words,
these two users are making post m viral.
pi,j =
|{m ∈Mvir|∃t, t′where t < t′ and
(i,m, t), (j,m, t′) ∈ Actions}|
|m ∈M |∃t, t′where (i,m, t), (j,m, t′) ∈ Actions| (4.3)
Second, the probability that key user j tweets/retweets viral post m and user i does not
tweet/retweet earlier than j. In other words, only user j is making post m viral.
p¬i,j =
|{m ∈Mvir|∃t′ s.t. (j,m, t′) ∈ Actions and
6 ∃t where t < t′, (i,m, t) ∈ Actions}|
|{m ∈M |∃t′ s.t. (j,m, t′) ∈ Actions and
6 ∃t where t < t′, (i,m, t) ∈ Actions}|
(4.4)
Knowing the action log, we aim to find a set of pathogenic social media (PSM) accounts.
These users are associated with the early stages of large information cascades and, once
detected, are often deactivated by a social media firm. In the causal framework, we introduce
a series of causality-based metrics for identifying PSM users.
4.2.2 Causal Framework
We adopt the causal inference framework previously introduced in [78, 38]. We expand
upon that work in two ways: (1.) we adopt it to the problem of identifying PSM accounts and
(2.) we extend their single causal metric to a set of metrics. Multiple causality measurements
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provide a stronger determination of significant causality relationships. For a given viral
cascade, we seek to identify potential users who likely cause the cascade viral. We first
require an initial set of criteria for such a causal user. We do this by instantiating the notion
of Prima Facie causes to our particular use case below:
Definition 4.2.4. (Prima Facie Causal User). A user u is a prima facie causal user of
cascade m iff: User u is a key user of m, m ∈Mvir, and pm|u > ρ.
For a given cascadem, we will often use the language prima facie causal user to describe
user i is a prima facie cause for m to be viral. In determining if a given prima facie causal
user is causal, we must consider other “related” users. In this chapter, we say i and j are
m-related if (1.) i and j are both prima facie causal users for m, (2.) i and j are both key
users for m, and (3.) i precedes j. Hence, we will define the set of “related users” for user i
(denoted R(i)) as follows:
R(i) = {j s.t. j 6= i , ∃m ∈M s.t. i, j are m− related} (4.5)
Therefore, pi,j in (4.3) is the probability that cascade m goes viral given both users
i and j, and p¬i,j in (4.4) is the probability that cascade m goes viral given key user j
tweets/retweets it while key user i does not tweet/retweet m or precedes j. The idea is that if
pi,j − p¬i,j > 0, then user i is more likely a cause than j for m to become viral. We measure
Kleinberg-Mishra causality (K&M ) as the average of this quantity to determine how causal
a given user i is as follows:
K&M(i) =
∑
j∈R(i)(pi,j − p¬i,j)
|R(i)| (4.6)
Intuitively, K&M measures the degree of causality exhibited by user i. Additionally, we find
it useful to include a few other measures. We introduce relative likelihood causality (rel) as
follows:
rel(i) =
∑
j∈R(i) S(i, j)
|R(i)| (4.7)
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S(i, j) =

(
pi,j
p¬i,j+α
)− 1, pi,j > p¬i,j
0, pi,j = p¬i,j′
1− (p¬i,j
pi,j
), otherwise
(4.8)
where α is infinitesimal. Relative likelihood causality metric assesses the relative
difference between pi,j and p¬i,j . This helps us to find new users that may not be prioritized
by K&M . We also find that if a user is mostly appearing after those with the high value of
K&M , then it is likely to be a PSM account. One can consider all possible combinations
of events to capture this situation. However, this approach is computationally expensive.
Therefore, we define Q(j) as follows:
Q(j) = {i s.t. j ∈ R(i)} (4.9)
Consider the following example:
Example 4.2.1. Consider two cascades (actions) τ1 = {A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H} and τ2 =
{N, M, C, A, H, V, S, T} where the capital letters signify users. We aim to relate key users
while φ = 0.5 (Definition 4.2.2). Table 4.1 shows the related users R(.) for each cascade.
Note that the final set R(.) for each user, is the union of all sets from the cascades. Set Q(.)
for the users of Table 4.1 are presented in Table 4.2.
Accordingly, we define neighborhood-based causality (nb) as the average K&M(i) for
all i ∈ Q(j) as follows:
nb(j) =
∑
i∈Q(j) K&M(i)
|Q(j)| (4.10)
The intuition behind this metric is that accounts who are retweeting a message that was
tweeted/retweeted by several causal users are potential for PSM accounts. We also define
the weighted neighborhood-based causality (wnb) as follows:
wnb(j) =
∑
i∈Q(j)wi × K&M(i)∑
i∈Q(j)wi
(4.11)
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Table 4.1: Related Users R(.) (4.5) of Cascades τ1 = {A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H} and τ2 =
{N, M, C, A, H, V, S, T}
User Rτ1 Rτ2 R
A {B, C, D, E, F} {H, V} {B, C, D, E, F, H, V}
B {C, D, E, F} {} {C, D, E, F}
C {D, E, F} {A, H, V} {A,D, E, F, H, V}
D {E, F} {} {E, F}
E {F} {} {F}
N {} {M, C, A, H, V} {A, C, H, M, V}
M {} {C, A, H, V} {A, C, H, V}
H {} {V} {V}
The intuition behind the metric wnb is that the users in Q may not have the same impact
on user j and thus different weights wi are assigned to each user i with K&M(i).
4.2.3 Problem Statements
Our goal is to find the potential PSM accounts from the cascades. Assigning a score
to each user and applying threshold-based algorithm is one way of selecting users. In
the previous section, we defined causality metrics where each of them or combination of
them can be a strategy for assigning scores. Users with high values for causality metrics
are more likely to be PSM accounts - later we demonstrate the relationship between these
measurements and the real world by identifying accounts deactivated eventually.
Problem 1. (Threshold-based Problem). Given a causality metric k where k ∈ {K&M, rel, nb, wnb},
parameter θ, set of users U , we wish to identify set {u s.t. ∀u ∈ U, k(u) ≥ θ}.
We find that considering a set of cascades as a hypergraph where users of each cascade
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Table 4.2: Set Q(.) of Users Table 4.1 in (4.9)
User Total
A {C, N, M}
B {A}
C {A, B, N, M}
D {A, B, C}
E {A, B, C, D}
N {}
M {N}
H {A, C, N, M}
are connected to each other can better model the PSM accounts. The intuition is that densely
connected users with high values for causality are the most potential PSM accounts. In
other words, we are interested in selecting a user if (1.) it has a score higher than a specific
threshold or (2.) it has a lower score but occurs in the cascades where high score users occur.
Therefore, we define the label propagation problem as follows:
Problem 2. (Label Propagation Problem). Given a causality metric k where k ∈
{K&M, rel, nb, wnb}, parameters θ, λ, set of cascades T = {τ1, τ1, ..., τn}, and set of
users U , we wish to identify set S : S1,S2, ...,Sl, ...,S|U | where Sl = {u|∀τ ∈ T ,∀u ∈
(τ\Sl−1), k(u) ≥ (H lτ − λ)} and H lτ = {min(k(u)) s.t. ∀u ∈ τ ∧ u ∈
⋃
l′∈[1,l)
Sl′}.
4.3 Algorithms
4.3.1 Algorithm for Threshold-based Problems
To calculate causality metrics, we use map-reduce programming model. In this approach,
we select users with causality value greater than or equal to a specific threshold. We refer to
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this approach as the Threshold-based Selection Approach.
4.3.2 Label Propagation Algorithms
Label propagation algorithms [85, 6, 56] iteratively propagate labels of a seed set to
their neighbors. All nodes or a subset of nodes in the graph are usually used as a seed set.
We propose a Label Propagation Algorithm (Algorithm 3) to solve problem 2. We first take
users with causality value greater than or equal to a specific threshold (i.e. 0.9) as the seed
set. Then, in each iteration, every selected user u can activate user u′ if the following two
conditions are satisfied: (1.) u and u′ have at least one cascade (action) in common and (2.)
k(u
′) ≥ k(u)− λ, λ ∈ (0, 1). Note that, we set a minimum threshold such as 0.7 so that
all users are supposed to satisfy it. In this algorithm, inputs are a set of cascades (actions) T ,
causality metric k and two parameters θ, λ in (0, 1). This algorithm is illustrated by a toy
example:
Example 4.3.1. Consider three cascades {{A, B, G}, {A, B, C, D, E, G, H, I}, {E, H, I}}
as shown in hypergraph Fig. 4.1. Let us consider the minimum acceptable value as 0.7; in
this case, users C and E would not be activated in this algorithm. Assuming two parameters
θ = 0.9, λ = 0.1, both users A and G get activated (Fig. 4.1a). Note that an active user is
able to activate inactive ones if (1.) it is connected to the inactive user in the hypergraph, (2.)
score of the inactive user meets the threshold. In the next step, only user B will be influenced
by G (0.82 ≥ 0.92− 0.1) as it is shown in Fig. 4.1b. Then, user D will be influenced by user
B (0.73 ≥ 0.82 − 0.1). In the next step (Fig. 4.1d), the algorithm terminate since no new
user is adopted. As it is shown, user I and H are not influenced although they have larger
values of  in comparison with user D.
Proposition 1. Given a set of cascades T , a threshold θ, parameter λ, and causality
values k where k ∈ {K&M, rel, nb, wnb}, ProSel returns a set of usersR = {u|k(u) ≥
θ or ∃u′ s.t. u′, u ∈ τ, k(u) ≥ k(u′)− λ and u′ is picked}. SetR is equivalent to the set
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 4.1: A Toy Example of Algorithm ProSel. Blue Faces Depict Active Users.
S in Problem 2.
4.4 ISIS Dataset
Our dataset consists of ISIS related tweets/retweets in Arabic gathered from Feb. 2016
to May 2016. The dataset includes tweets and the associated information such as user ID,
re-tweet ID, hashtags, content, date and time. About 53M tweets are collected based on
the 290 hashtags such as Terrorism, State of the Islamic-Caliphate, Rebels, Burqa State,
and Bashar-Assad, Ahrar Al-Sham, and Syrian Army. In this chapter, we only use tweets
(more than 9M) associated with viral cascades. The statistics of the dataset are presented in
Table 4.3 discussed in details below.
Cascades. In this chapter, we aim to identify PSM accounts - which in this dataset are
mainly social bots or terrorism-supporting accounts that participate in viral cascades. The
tweets that have been retweeted from 102 to 18,892 times. This leads to more than 35k
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Algorithm 3 Label Propagation Algorithm (ProSel)
1: procedure PROSEL(T , k, θ, λ)
2: S = {(u, k(u))|∀u ∈ U, k(u) ≥ θ}
3: R = S
4: H = ∅
5: while |S| > 0 do
6: H ′ = {(τ, m)|∀(τ, ) ∈ H, m = min(,min({′ = Su s.t. ∀u ∈ τ ∧ u ∈
S}))}
7: H = H ′ ∪ {(τ, m)|∀τ ∈ T ∧ τ 6∈ H ′, m = min({ = Su s.t. ∀u ∈ τ ∧ u ∈
S})}
8: S = {(u, )|∀τ ∈ T , ∀u ∈ τ, u 6∈ R, k(u) ≥ (Hτ − λ)}
9: R = R∪ S
10: returnR
(a) All Users (b) Distinct Users
Fig. 4.2: Distribution of Cascades vs Cascade Size
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Table 4.3: Statistics of the Dataset
Name Values
Tweets 9,092,978
Cascades 35,251
Users 1,249,293
Generator users 8,056
cascades which are tweeted or retweeted by more than 1M users. The distribution of the
number of cascades vs cascade size is illustrated in Fig. 4.2a. There are users that retweet
their own tweet or retweet a post several times, we only consider the first tweet/retweet
of each user for a given cascade. In other words, duplicate users are removed from the
cascades, which make the size of the viral cascades from 20 to 18,789 as shown in Fig. 4.2b.
The distribution of the cascades over the cascade life span is illustrated in Fig. 4.3. Cascades
took from 16 seconds to more than 94 days to complete.
Fig. 4.3: Cumulative Distribution of Duration of Cascades.
Users. There are more than 1M users that have participated in the viral cascades. Fig. 4.4
demonstrates the cumulative distribution of the number of times a user have participated in
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Fig. 4.4: Cumulative Distribution of User’s Occurrence in the Dataset.
Fig. 4.5: Total Inactive Users in Every Cascade
the cascades. As it is shown, the larger the support value is, the less number of users exists.
Moreover, users have tweeted or retweeted posts from 1 to 3,904 times and on average each
user has participated more than 7 times.
User’s Current Status. We select key users that have tweeted or retweeted a post in its
early life span - among first half of the users (according to Definition 4.2.2, φ = 0.5), and
check whether they are active or not. Accounts are not active if they are suspended or
deleted. More than 88% of the users are active as shown in Table 4.4. The statistics of
the generator users are also reported. Generator users are those that have initiated a viral
cascade. As shown, 90% of the generator users are active as well. Moreover, there are a
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Table 4.4: Status of a Subset of the Users in Dataset
Name Active Inactive Total
Users 723,727 93,770 817,497
Generator users 7,243 813 8,056
significant number of cascades with hundreds of inactive users. The number of inactive
users in every cascade is illustrated in Fig. 4.5. Inactive users are representative of automatic
and terrorism accounts aiming to disseminate their propaganda and manipulate the statistics
of the hashtags of their interest.
Generator Users. In this part, we only consider users that have generated (started) the viral
tweets. According to Table 4.4, there are more than 7K active and 800 inactive generator
users. That is, more than 10% of the generator users are suspended or deleted, which
means they are potentially automated accounts. The distribution of the number of tweets
generated by generator users shows that most of the users (no matter active and inactive)
have generated a few posts (less than or equal to 3) while only a limited number of users are
with a large number of tweets.
4.5 Causality Analysis
Here we examine the behavior of the causality metrics. We analyze users considering
their current account status in Twitter. We label a user as active (inactive) if the account is
still active (suspended or deleted).
Kleinberg-Mishra Causality. We study the users that get their causality value of K&M
greater than or equal to 0.5. As expected, inactive users exhibit different distribution from
active users (Fig. 4.6a). We note that significant differences are present - more than 75% of
the active users are distributed between 0.5 and 0.62, while more than 50% of the inactive
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users are distributed from 0.75 to 1. Also, inactive users have larger values of mean and
median than active ones. Note that number of active and inactive users are 404,536 and
52,452. This confirms that this metric is a good indicator to discriminate PSM users from
the normal users.
Relative Likelihood Causality. This metric magnifies the interval between every pairs of
the probabilities that measures the causality of the users; therefore, the values vary in a wide
range. Fig. 4.6b displays the distribution of users having relative likelihood causality of
greater than or equal to two. In this metric, 1,274 users get very large values. For the sake
of readability, very large values are replaced with 34.0 in Fig. 4.6b. More than 50% of the
inactive users get values greater than 32, while the median of active users is 2.48. More than
75% of the active users are distributed in the range of (2, 4). Note that number of active
and inactive users in this figure are 3,563 and 1,041, respectively. That is, using this metric
and filtering users with the relative likelihood greater than a threshold, leads to the good
precision. For example, the threshold in Fig. 4.6b is set to 2 - the precision is more than 0.22
for inactive class. Considering users with a very large value leads to the precision of more
than 0.5 and uncovering a significant number of PSMs - 638 inactive users.
Neighborhood-Based Causality. We study the users that get their causality value of nb
greater than or equal to 0.5. As expected, inactive users exhibit different distribution from
active users as shown in Fig. 4.6c. Also, inactive users are mostly distributed in the higher
range and have larger values of mean and median than active ones. More than 75% of
the active users are distributed between 0.5 and 0.6, while more than 50% of the inactive
users are distributed from 0.6 to 1. Therefore, increasing the threshold results in the higher
precision for the PSM users. Note that the number of active and inactive users are 85,864
and 10,165.
Weighted Neighborhood-Based Causality. This metric is the weighted version of the
previous metric (nb). We assign weight to each user in proportion to her participation rate
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(a) K&M ≥ 0.5 (b) rel ≥ 2
(c) nb ≥ 0.5 (d) wnb ≥ 0.5
Fig. 4.6: Distribution of Various Causality Metrics for Active and Inactive Users.
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in the viral cascades. Fig. 4.6d shows the distribution of users with wnb greater than or
equal to 0.5. This metric also displays different distribution for active and inactive users.
More than 75% of the active users are distributed between 0.5 and 0.6, while more than
50% of the inactive users are distributed from 0.6 to 1. Note that the number of active and
inactive users of wnb are 52,346 and 16,412. In other words, this metric achieves the largest
precision compared to other metrics, 0.24. Clearly, increasing the threshold results in the
higher precision for the PSMs.
4.6 Results and Discussion
We implement our code in Scala Spark and Python 2.7x and run it on a machine equipped
with an Intel Xeon CPU (1.6 GHz) with 128 GB of RAM running Windows 7. We set the
parameter φ to label key users 0.5 (Definition 4.2.2). Thus, we are looking for the users that
participate in the action before the number of participants gets twice.
In the following sections, first we look at the existing methods. Then we look at two
proposed approaches (see Section 4.3): (1) Threshold-based Selection Approach - selecting
users based on a specific threshold, (2) Label Propagation Selection Approach - selecting by
applying Algorithm 3. The intuition behind this approach is to select a user if it has a score
higher than a threshold or has a lower score but occurs in the cascades that high score users
exist. We evaluate methods based on true positive (True Pos), false positive (False Pos),
precision, the average (Avg CS) and median (Med CS) of cascade size of the detected PSM
accounts. Note that in our problem, precision is the most important metric. The main reason
is labeling an account as PSM means it should be deleted. However, removing a real user is
costly. Therefore, it is important to have a high precison to prevent removing real user.
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4.6.1 Existing Method
Here we use the approach proposed by the top-ranked team in the DARPA Twitter
Bot Challenge [77]. We consider all features that we could extract from our dataset. Our
features include tweet syntax (average number of hashtags, average number of user mentions,
average number of links, average number of special characters), tweet semantics (LDA
topics), and user behaviour (tweet spread, tweet frequency, tweet repeats). We apply three
existing methods to detect PSM accounts: 1) Random selection: This method achieves
the precision of 0.11. This also presents that our data is imbalanced and less than 12% of
the users are PSM accounts. 2) Sentimetrix: We cluster our data by DBSCAN algorithm.
We then propagate the labels from 40 initial users to the users in each cluster based on
the similarity metric. We use Support Vector Machines (SVM) to classify the remaining
PSM accounts [77]. 3) Classification methods: In this experiment, we use the same labeled
accounts as the previous experiment and apply different machine learning algorithms to
predict the label of other samples. We group features based on the limitations of access to
data into three categories. First, we consider only using content information (Content) to
detect the PSM accounts. Second, we use content independent features (No content) [77] to
classify users. Third, we apply all features (All features) to discriminate PSM accounts. The
best result for each setting is when we apply Random Forest using all features. According
to the results, this method achieves the highest precision of 0.16. Note that, most of the
features used in the previous work and our baseline take advantage of both content and
network structure. However, there are situations that the network information and content
do not exist. In this situation, the best baseline has the precision of 0.15. We study the
average (Avg CS) and median (Med CS) of the size of the cascades in which the selected
PSM accounts have participated. Table 4.5 also illustrates the false positive, true positive
and precision of different methods.
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Table 4.5: Existing Methods - Number of Selected Users as PSM
Method False Pos True Pos Precision Avg CS Med CS
Random 80,700 10,346 0.11 289.99 184
Sentimetrix 640,552 77,984 0.11 261.37 171
Content 292,039 43,483 0.13 267.66 174
Nocontent 357,027 63,025 0.15 262.97 172
Allfeatures 164,012 31,131 0.16 273.21 176
4.6.2 Threshold-based Selection Approach
In this experiment, we select all the users that satisfy the thresholds and check whether
they are active or not. A user is inactive, if the account is suspended or closed. Since the
dataset is not labeled, we label inactive users as PSM accounts. We set the threshold for all
metrics to 0.7 except for relative likelihood causality (rel), which is set to 7. We conduct
two types of experiments: first, we study user selection for a given causality metric. We
further study this approach using the combinations of metrics.
Single Metric Selection. In this experiment, we attempt to select users based on each
individual metric. As expected, these metrics can help us filter a significant amount of
active users and overcome the data imbalance issue. Metric K&M achieves the largest recall
in comparison with other metrics. However, it has the largest number of false positives.
Table 4.6 shows the performance of each metric. The precision value varies from 0.43 to
0.66 and metric wnb achieves the best value. Metric rel finds the more important PSM
accounts with average cascade size of 567.78 and median of 211. In general, our detected
PSM accounts have participated in the larger cascades in comparison with baseline methods.
We also observe that these metrics cover different regions of the search area. In other words,
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they select different user sets with little overlap between each other. The common users
between any two pairs of the features are illustrated in Table 4.7. Considering the union of
all metrics, 36,983 and 30,353 active and inactive users are selected, respectively.
Table 4.6: Threshold-based Selection Approach - Number of Selected Users Using Single
Metric
Method False Pos True Pos Precision Avg CS Med CS
All features 164,012 31,131 0.16 273.21 176
No content 357,027 63,025 0.15 262.97 172
K&M 36,159 27,192 0.43 383.99 178
rel 693 641 0.48 567.78 211
nb 2,268 2,927 0.56 369.46 183.5
wnb 7,463 14,409 0.66 311.84 164
Table 4.7: Threshold-based Selection Approach - Number of Common Selected Users Using
Single Metric
Status Active Inactive
Method rel nb wnb rel nb wnb
K&M 404 1,903 6,992 338 2,340 11,748
rel 231 175 248 229
wnb 1,358 1,911
Combination of Metrics Selection. According to Table 4.7, most of the metric pairs have
more inactive users in common than active users. In this experiment, we discuss if using
the combination of these metrics can help improve the performance. We attempt to select
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users that satisfy the threshold for at least three metrics. We get 1,636 inactive users out of
2,887 selected ones, which works better than K&M and rel while worse than nb and wnb.
In brief, this approach achieves precision of 0.57. Moreover, the number of false positives
(1,251) is lower than most of the other metrics.
4.6.3 Label Propagation Selection Approach
In label propagation selection, we first select a set of users that have a high causality
score as seeds, then ProSel selects users that occur with those seeds and have a score higher
than a threshold iteratively. Also, the seed set in each iteration is the selected users of the
previous iteration. The intuition behind this approach is to select a user if it has a score
higher than a threshold or has a lower score but occurs in the cascades that high score users
occur. We set the parameters of ProSel Algorithm as follows: λ = 0.1, θ = 0.9, except for
relative likelihood causality, where we set λ = 1, θ = 9. Table 4.8 shows the performance
of each metric. Precision of these metrics varies from 0.47 to 0.75 and wnb achieves the
highest precision. Metrics rel with average cascade size of 612.04 and nb with median
of 230 find the more important PSM accounts. Moreover, detected PSM accounts have
participated in the larger cascades compared with threshold-based selection. This approach
also produces much lower number of false positives compared to threshold-based selection.
The comparison between this approach and threshold-based selection is illustrated in Fig. 4.7.
From the precision perspective, label propagation method outperforms the threshold-based
one.
The number of common users selected by any pair of two metrics are also illustrated in
Table 4.9. It shows that our metrics are powerful to cover different regions of the search area
and identify different sets of users. In total, 10,254 distinct active users and 16,096 inactive
ones are selected.
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Table 4.8: Label Propagation Selection Approach - Number of Selected Users
Method False Pos True Pos Precision Avg CS Med CS
All features 164,012 31,131 0.16 273.21 176
No content 357,027 63,025 0.15 262.97 172
K&M 9,305 14,176 0.60 390.52 179
rel 561 498 0.47 612.04 216
nb 1,101 1,768 0.62 403.55 230
wnb 1,318 4,000 0.75 355.24 183.5
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Fig. 4.7: Comparison Between Threshold-based and Label Propagation Selection Ap-
proaches for the Inactive Class
4.7 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, this chapter represents the first unsupervised approach on
PSM detection. The majority of previous work was based on three fundamental assumptions.
First, the information of the network is known [77, 29, 7, 1]. This assumption may not
hold in reality. Second, they are language dependent [77, 45]. Third, the majority of
botnet detection algorithms focused on bots in general. That is, they did consider the bots
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Table 4.9: Label Propagation Selection Approach - Number of Common Selected Users
Status Active Inactive
Method rel nb wnb rel nb wnb
K&M 289 581 1,122 168 1,019 2,788
rel 15 6 180 102
nb 151 833
equally [45, 22] where in this work, we identify PSM accounts that spread viral information.
Here, we review related work on identifying automatic accounts and terrorist groups. Aside
from the bot detection work, our work can be compared with detection of water armies.
Identifying Automatic Accounts. Due to the importance of the issue, DARPA conducted
the Twitter bot detection challenge to identify and eliminate influential bots [77]. In this
challenge, all teams applied supervised or semi-supervised learning approaches using the
diverse sets of features. Most of the previous work extracted different sets of features (tweet
syntax and semantics, temporal behavior, user profile, and network features) and conducted
supervised or semi-supervised approaches [77, 22, 45]. On the other hand, here, we focus on
situations where neither network information nor account related attributes and user profile
information are available. Our appproach is also independent of content and language.
Analysis of Terrorist Groups and Detection of Water Armies. Terrorist groups use social
media for propaganda dissemination [3]. Benigni et al. [7] conducted vertex clustering and
classification to find Islamic Jihad Supporting Community on Twitter. Abdokhodair et al.
[1] studied the behaviors and characteristics of Syrian social botnet. Chen et al. [18] found
that within the context of news report comments, user-specific measurements can distinguish
water army from normal users. Similarly, in [17], Chen et al. applied user behavior and
domain-specific features to detect water armies. Our work is different from them since
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these methods also applied features related to the accounts and network (follower/followee).
However, we do not have any network information and account-related features.
4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we studied induction and abduction reasonings on large-scale dataset.
we conducted a data-driven study on the pathogenic social media accounts especially
terrorist supporters, automatic accounts and bots. We proposed unsupervised causality
based framework to detect these groups. Our approach identifies these users without using
network structure, cascade path information, content and user’s information. We believe
our technique can be applied in the areas such as detection of water armies and fake news
campaigns.
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Chapter 5
SUPERVISED AND SEMI-SUPERVISED FRAMEWORKS TO DETECT PATHOGENIC
SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS
5.1 Introduction
In previous chapter, we proposed causality metrics which are able to detect most of
pathogenic social media (PSM) accounts imprecisely (high recall and low precision) or
precisely small portion of it (high precision and low recall). In this chapter, our goal is to
detect precisely larger portions. In other words, reducing the rate of false positive accounts.
We expand on the previous work in [66] and propose graph-based metrics to distinguish
PSM accounts from normal users within a short time around their activities. Our new
metrics combined with our causal ones can achieve high precision 0.90, while increasing the
recall from 0.22 to 0.49. We propose supervised and semi-supervised approaches and then
show our proposed methods outperform the ones in the literature. In summary, the major
contributions of this chapter are itemized as follows:
• We propose supervised and semi-supervised PSM detection frameworks that do not
leverage network structure, cascade path information, content and user’s information.
• We introduce graph-based framework using the cascades and propose a series of
scalable metrics to identify PSM users. We apply this framework to more than 722K
users and 35K cascades.
• We propose a deep neural network framework which achieves AUC of 0.82. We
show that our framework significantly outperforms Sentimetrix [77] (0.74), causal-
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ity [66] (0.73), time-decay causality [5] (0.66), and causal community detection-based
classification [5] (0.6).
• We introduce a self-training semi-supervised framework that can capture more than
29K PSM users with the precision of 0.81. We only used 600 labeled data from
training and development sets. Moreover, if a supervisor is involved in the training
loop, the proposed algorithm is able to capture more than 80K PSM users.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we describe our framework
that leverages causal metrics, graph-based metrics. We present the algorithms in Section 5.3.
This is followed by a description of our dataset in Section 5.4. Then we describe our
implementation and discuss our results in Section 5.5. Finally, related work is reviewed in
Section 5.6.
5.2 Technical Approach
5.2.1 Graph-based Framework
User-Message Bipartite Graph. Here, we denoteActions as a bipartite graphGu−m(U,M,E),
where users U and messages M are disjoint sets of vertices. There is an annotated
link from user u to message m if u has tweeted/retweeted m and is annotated by oc-
currence time t (see Fig. 5.1). In other words, every edge in graph Gu−m is associ-
ated with one tuple (u,m, t) ∈ Actions. For a given node u ∈ U(m ∈ M), the set
Nu = {m′ ∈ M s.t. (u,m′) ∈ E}(Nm = {u′ ∈ U s.t. (u′,m) ∈ E}) is the set of imme-
diate neighbors of u (m). We also define U v ⊂ U which is the set of verified users (often
celebrities). We indicate U vm = {u|(u,m, t) ∈ Actions, u ∈ U v} as a set of verified users
that have re/tweeted message m.
As for the edges, we examine different metrics such as Jaccard similarity between
users, and rank of a user in a message which is defined as Rank(u,m) = |{(u′,m, t′) ∈
86
Fig. 5.1: User-message Bipartite Graph and User Graph. Red and Purple Nodes Represent
Users and Messages Respectively. Users Are Labeled by Their Current Status (Active, Not
Found, Suspended) and Messages With the Length of the Cascade (Degree). Blue and Green
Edges Represent User-message and User-user Relationships.
Actions|(u,m, t) ∈ Actions, t′ < t}|. We also define normalized rank as:
NR(u,m) = 1− Rank(u,m)Nm (5.1)
Our intuition behind rank metric Rank(u,m) is that the earlier a user has participated in
spreading a message, the more important the user is. In this regard, we can also define the
exponential decay of the time as:
T mu = exp(−γ∆tmu ) (5.2)
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where ∆tmu = {t|(u,m, t) ∈ Actions} − min({t′|(u′,m, t′) ∈ Actions}), and γ is a
constant. This metric prioritizes based on the retweeting time of the message. In other
words, this metric assigns different weights to different time points of a given time interval,
inversely proportional to their duration from start of the cascade, i.e., smaller duration is
associated with higher weight.
Using all these information, we then annotated users U based on their local and net-
work characteristics such as degree, and PageRank. We also consider function F ∈
{sum,max,min, avg,med, std} to calculate statistics such as minimum, mean, median,
maximum, and standard deviation based on their one-hop or two-hops neighbors. For
example, for a given user u, mean of re/tweeted message’s PageRank of user u proved to
be among top predictive metrics according to our experiments. Using these intuitions, we
explored the space of variants features and list those we found to be best-performing in
Table 5.1.
User Graph. We represent a directed weighted user graph G(V ′, E ′) where the set of nodes
V ′ corresponds with key users. There is a link between two users if they are both key users
of at least one message. There is a link from i (j) to j (i) if the number of times that “i
appears before j and both are key users” is equal to or larger (smaller) than the case when “j
appears before i”, see Fig. 5.1. For a given node i, the set N outi = {i′ ∈ V ′ s.t. (i, i′) ∈ E ′}
(N ini = {i′ ∈ V ′ s.t. (i′, i) ∈ E ′})- the set of outgoing (incoming) immediate neighbors of
i. The weight of edges is determined as a variant of co-occurences of the key user pairs:
COi,j =
|{m|i, j are key users, ∃t, t′ where t < t′,
(i,m, t), (j,m, t′) ∈ Actions}|
min(|{m|i is a key user}|, |{m|j is a key user}|) (5.3)
Using COi,j , we then propose a weighted co-occurrence score for user i as:
COwi,Ni =
∑
j∈Ni(abs(δi,j) + 1)× COi,j∑
j∈Ni(abs(δi,j) + 1)
(5.4)
where abs(·) denotes the absolute value of the input. The differences between ordered joint
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Table 5.1: User-message Bipartite Graph-based Metrics
Name Definition
Degree Dv = |{v′|(v, v′) ∈ E ∨ (v′, v) ∈ E}|
Cascade size statistics CSu,F = Fm∈NuDm
PageRank PR(v) = 1−d
N
+ d
∑
v′∈Nv
PR(v′)
L(v′)
Message’s PageRank statistics PSu,F = Fm∈NuPR(m)
Number of verified users V rm = |{u|(u,m) ∈ E, u ∈ U v}|
Jaccard similarity statistics JSu,F = Fu′∈U |Nu∩Nu′ ||Nu∪Nu′ |
Intersection statistics ISu,F = Fu′∈U |Nu ∩Nu′|
Normalized rank statistics NRSu,F = Fm∈NuNR(u,m)
T statistics T Su,F = Fm∈NuT mu
Verified users in the cascades statistics U vSu,F = Fm∈Nu |U vm|
occurrences δi,j is also defined as:
δi,j =
|{m|∃t, t′ s.t. t < t′, (i,m, t), (j,m, t′) ∈ Actions}|
− |{m|∃t, t′ s.t. t > t′, (i,m, t), (j,m, t′) ∈ Actions}|
(5.5)
The list of user graph-based metrics extracted from graph G is shown in Table 5.2. We
further calculate the probability of “user j appears after user i” as:
P(j,i) =
|{m ∈Mvir|∃t, t′where t < t′ and
(i,m, t), (j,m, t′) ∈ Actions}|
|{m|(j,m, t) ∈ Actions}| (5.6)
The average probability that user i appears before its related users R(i) is also a good
indicator for identifying PSM accounts:
CMi =
∑
R(i) P(j,i)
|R(i)| (5.7)
We aim to evaluate users from different perspectives and these metrics have shown to be
helpful for evaluating users and detecting PSM accounts.
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Table 5.2: User Graph-based Metrics
Description Definition
Degree |N outi |
Outgoing co-occurrence score statistics COSouti,F = Fj∈N outi COi,j
Incoming co-occurrence score statistics COSini,F = Fj∈N ini COi,j
Weighted co-occurrence score COwi,Nouti
Number of outgoing verified users |{j|j ∈ N outi , j ∈ U v}|
Number of incoming verified |{j|j ∈ N ini , j ∈ U v}|
Triangles Number of triangles
Clustering coefficient CCi =
|{(j,k)|j,k∈Ni,(j,k)∈E′}|
|Ni|×(|Ni|−1)
5.2.2 Problem Statement
Our goal is to find the potential PSM accounts from the cascades. In the previous section,
we discussed causality metrics, and defined diverse set of features using both user-message
bipartite and user graphs where these metrics can discriminate the users of interest.
Problem. (Early PSM Account Detection). Given Action log Actions, causality and
structural metrics, we wish to identify set of key users that are PSM accounts.
5.3 PSM Account Detection Algorithm
We employ supervised, and semi-supervised approaches for detecting PSM accounts.
Proposed metrics are scalable and can be calculated efficiently using map-reduce program-
ming model and storing data in a graph-based database. To such aim, we used Neo4j to
store data and calculated most of the structural metrics using Cypher query language [83].
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5.3.1 Supervised Learning Approach
We evaluate several supervised learning approaches including logistic regression (LR),
naive bayes (NB), k-nearest neighbors (KNN) and random forest (RF) on the same set of
features. We also develop a dense deep neural network structure using Keras. As for the
deep neural network and in order to find the best architecture and hyperparamters, we utilize
the random search method. Many model structures were tested and Fig. 5.2 illustrates the
best architecture.
Fig. 5.2: The Proposed Deep Neural Net Structure
As we can see from Fig. 5.2, the proposed deep neural net, in fact, consists of three
dense deep neural net structures. The first two structures are of the same, but the activation
functions of their layers are different. The intuition is that we aimed to capture the most
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useful information from the input data and our experiments show the ReLU and Sigmoid
activation functions can contribute to this. Specifically, these two structures are aimed to
filter the noises in the input data and prepare clean inputs to feed into the third structure. In
this regard, the outputs of these two structures along with the input data are concatenated
into one vector and this vector is fed into another dense deep neural net. Finally, the output
of this structure is fed into a regular output layer. To avoid overfitting, we used dropout
method. In the proposed framework, the binary cross entropy loss function is minimized
and the best optimizers are reported as Adam and Adagrad.
5.3.2 Self-training Semi-supervised Learning Approach
Semi-supervised algorithms [77, 84] use unlabeled data along with the labeled data
to better capture the shape of the underlying data distribution and generalize better to
new samples. Here, we propose a Weighted Self-training Algorithm (WSET) shown in
Algorithm 4 to address such problem. We start with small amount of labeled training data
and iteratively add users with high confidence scores from unlabeled data to the training
set. Lets denote labeled data L = {ui, li} and unlabeled data U = {uj}. Labeled data is
split to training set Lt and development set Ld. We then iteratively train a classifier using
training set and predict the confidence scores for development set and unlabeled data. Based
on the confidence score obtained from development set, a threshold is determined. We then
select all samples from unlabaled data that satisfy the threshold. Next, those samples are
removed from unlabeled set and are added to the training set. The termination condition
is determined based on at most θtr drop in accuracy on the development set or minimum
number of selected users by algorithm.
There are still two main questions that need to be answered:
Q1. Should all training samples be weighted equally?
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Algorithm 4 Weighted Self-training Algorithm (WSeT)
1: procedure WSET(L = {ui, li}, U = {uj}, α, β, θpr, θtr)
2: Split L to training set Lt and development set Ld
3: Lt.wc = 1
4: it = 1
5: m = Train a classification model using Lt
6: Ld.p = confidence score p using m of Ld
7: c = accuracy of model m on Ld
8: c′ = c
9: while c′ >= c− θtr do
10: U.p = confidence score p using m of U
11: Update Lt and U by Algorithm 5 (Lt, Ld, U, α, β, θpr, it)
12: m = Train a classification model using Lt
13: Ld.p = confidence score p using m of Ld
14: c′ = accuracy of model m on Ld
15: it = it+ 1
16: return Lt
Q2. How should a threshold be determined for adding unlabeled data to the labeled set?
Since the prediction mistake reinforces itself, and the prediction error increases by
number of iterations, the way we choose samples is of importance. According to our
experiments, all training samples should not be weighted equally. We found the exponential
decay weighting approach as the most efficient one (see Q1). Considering a sample with
confidence pl associated to a specific label l in iteration it, the exponential decay weighting
approach is defined as:
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exp(−β × it× ( 1
1− pl )) (5.8)
where β is a parameter. To answer the second question, we pick the threshold to have the
minimum precision of θpr on development set in each iteration. Since the precision decreases
as the algorithm iterates, the threshold is required to be adjusted in order to make sure the
top ranked and qualified samples are picked up. Mathematically, the updated threshold in
each iteration is defined as follows:
θpr − α× (it− 1) (5.9)
where α is a parameter, α ∈ [0, 1
it−1 ], it > 0. We pick 0.005 for the experiments. If it = 1,
the threshold is equal to θpr. As the number of iteration increases the threshold is updated
according to the product of α and iteration number it. This approach can make sure that
we are picking samples with acceptable confidence. Algorithm 5 presents our approach for
updating labeled and unlabaled datasets.
Algorithm 5 Update Weighted Self-training Datasets Algorithm (UpDWSeT)
1: procedure UPDWSET(Lt, Ld, U, α, β, θpr, it)
2: S = ∅
3: for l ∈ [True, False] do
4: thr = FindPrecisionThreshold(Ld, θpr − α× (it− 1), label = l)
5: S = S ∪ {u ∈ U |u.p ≥ thr}
6: U = U − S
7: S.wc = exp(−β × it× ( 11−p))
8: Lt = Lt ∪ S
9: return Lt, U
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5.4 ISIS Dataset
Our dataset is the same as previous chapter. The dataset includes tweets and the
associated information such as user ID, re-tweet ID, hashtags, number of followers, number
of followee, content, date and time. About 53M tweets are collected based on the 290
hashtags such as State of the Islamic-Caliphate, and Islamic State. In this chapter, we only
use tweets (more than 9M) associated with viral cascades. Dataset is labeled based on their
status in Nov. 2018 on Twitter. Accounts are not active if they are suspended or deleted.
Less than 24% of the users are inactive. Inactive users are representative of automatic and
terrorism accounts aiming to disseminate their propaganda and manipulate the statistics of
the hashtags of their interest.
5.5 Results and Discussion
We implement part of our code in Scala Spark and Python 2.7x and run it on a machine
equipped with an Intel Xeon CPU (2 processors of 2.4 GHz) with 256 GB of RAM running
Windows 7. We also implement most of structural metrics in Cypher query language. We
create the graphs using Neo4j [83] on a machine equipped with an Intel Xeon CPU (2
processors of 2.4 GHz) with 520 GB of RAM. We set the parameter φ as 0.5 to label key
users. That is, we are looking for the users that participate in the action before the number
of participants gets twice.
In the following sections, first we look at the baseline methods. Then we address
the performance of two proposed approaches (see Section 5.3): (1) Supervised Learning
Approach: applying different supervised learning methods on proposed metrics, (2) Self-
training Semi-supervised Learning Approach: selecting users by applying Algorithm 4.
The intuition behind this approach is to select users with the high probability of being
either PSM or non-PSM (normal user) from unlabeled data and then adding them to the
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Table 5.3: Statistics of the Datasets Used in Experiments.
Name PSM accounts Normal accounts Total
A 19,859 65,417 85,276
B 137,248 585,396 722,644
training set in order to improve the performance. We evaluate methods based on both
Precision-Recall and Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curves. Note that in all
experiments, the training, development, and test sets are imbalanced with more normal
user accounts than PSM accounts. The statistics of the datasets are presented in Table 5.3.
Dataset A is randomly selected from dataset B using sklearn library [52]. Note that, all
random selections of data in the experiments have been done using sklearn library. We
repeated the experiments 3 times and picked the median output. It is worth to mention that
the variance among the results was negligible. In this problem, our goal is to achieve high
precision while maximizing the recall. The main reason is labeling an account as PSM
means it should be deleted. However, removing a normal user is costly. Therefore, it is
important to have a high precision to prevent removing the normal users.
5.5.1 Baseline Methods
We have compared our results with existing work for detecting PSM accounts [66, 5] or
bots [77].
Causality. This paper presents a set of causality metrics and unsupervised label propagation
model to identify PSM accounts [66]. However, since our approach is supervised, we only
use the causality metrics and evaluate its performance in a supervised framework.
C2DC. This approach uses time decay causal community detection-based classification to
detect PSM accounts [5]. We also considered time decay causal metrics with random forest
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(a) ROC Curve (b) Precision-Recall Curve
Fig. 5.3: Performance of the Baseline Methods on Dataset A
as another baseline method (TDCausality).
Sentimetrix. This approach is proposed by the top-ranked team in the DARPA Twitter
Bot Challenge [77]. We consider all features that we could extract from our dataset. Our
features include tweet syntax (average number of hashtags, average number of user mentions,
average number of links, average number of special characters), tweet semantics (LDA
topics), and user behaviour (tweet spread, tweet frequency, tweet repeats). The proposed
method starts with a small seed set and propagate the labels. As we have enough labeled
dataset for the training set, we use random forest as the learning approach.
We use dataset A to evaluate different approaches. Fig. 5.3a shows the precision-
recall curve for these methods. As it is shown, in the supervised framework, Sentimetrix
outperforms all approaches in general. Also, Causality is a comparable approach with
Sentimetrix with the constraint that the precision is no less than 0.9 as illustrated in Fig. 5.3b.
Note that, most of the features used in the previous bot detection work take advantage of
content and network structure of users. However, this is not the case in our proposed metrics
and approach.
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(a) ROC Curve (b) Precision-Recall Curve
Fig. 5.4: Performance of Different Supervised Approaches Using Proposed Metrics on
Dataset A
5.5.2 Supervised Learning Approach
In this section, we describe the classification results using proposed metrics with different
learning approaches. We used both datasets for this experiment. First, we use the same
dataset as we used in baseline experiments (A). Then, we use dataset B for comparing top
methods which is 8.5 times larger than dataset A.
Fig. 5.4a shows the ROC curve for different approaches. As it is shown, deep neural
network achieved the highest area under the curve. Note that, the deep neural network is
comparable with random forest as it is shown in Fig. 5.4b on Dataset A. The proposed
approaches could improve the recall from 0.22 to 0.49 with the precision of 0.9. According to
the random forest, top features are from all categories including causality metrics: nb, wnb,
user-message bipartite graph-based metrics: user’s PageRank PR(u), median of retweeted
message’s PageRank PSu,med, degree Du, mean of verified users in his messages U vSu,mean,
T Su,med, T Su,mean, median of length of the cascades CSu,med, user graph-based metrics:
weighted co-occurrence score COwu,Nu .
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(a) ROC Curve (b) Precision-Recall Curve
Fig. 5.5: Performance of the Top Two Supervised Approaches Using Proposed Metrics on
Dataset B
In Fig. 5.5b, we probe the performance of the top two supervised approaches on larger
dataset B. Deep neural network is able to achieve the recall of 0.48 with the precision of 0.9.
It is also able to achieve AUC of 0.83 on this dataset (Fig. 5.5a).
5.5.3 Self-training Semi-supervised Learning Approach
In this experiment, we randomly select 300 PSM and 300 normal users from dataset B
for training and development sets and the rest of the dataset was considered as unlabeled
data. We conduct two types of experiments:
WSeT Algorithm. In this experiment, we evaluate the self-training semi-supervised ap-
proach using Algorithm 4. In this approach, we iteratively update the training set and
the termination condition is accuracy of the model on the development set. We set the
parameters as θpr = 1, α = 0.05, θtr = 0.03. We use a random forest classifier to train the
model. The cumulative number of true positive and false positive is shown in Fig. 5.6a.
With using 300 PSM accounts as seed set, WSeT can find 29,440 PSM accounts with the
precision of 0.81. Note that, we can stop the algorithm earlier. In this case, the precision
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(a) PSM Users (b) Normal Users
Fig. 5.6: Cumulative Number of Selected Users Using WSeT Algorithm on Dataset B
varies from 0.97 to 0.81. Fig. 5.6b illustrates cumulative number of selected users as normal
users by WSeT. As it is shown, the number of true negatives (selected normal accounts as
normal users) is 18,343 with precision of 0.93.
Supervised WSeT Algorithm. In previous experiment, we assume that the supervisor
checks accounts labeled as PSM by WSeT at the end. However, this process can be done
iteratively. Here, we assume that the supervisor evaluates the PSM labeled accounts by
WSeT in each iteration and verify if they are either true or false positive. Therefore, these
labels along with the non-PSM labeled accounts by WSeT are fed into WSeT. According to
our results, the number of true positive increases to 80,652 with the precision of more than
0.8. That is, using this approach we can increase the number of true positive PSM accounts
2.7 times.
5.6 Related Work
In summary, majority of previous work was based on three fundamental assumptions
which make them different from our work. First, the information of the network is known [77,
29, 7, 1]. This assumption may not hold in reality. Second, they are language-dependent
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Fig. 5.7: Cumulative Number of Selected Users as PSM Accounts Using Supervised WSeT
Algorithm on Dataset B
[77, 45]. Third, the majority of botnet detection algorithms focused on bots in general. That
is, they did only consider the bots equally [45, 22] while in this work, we identify PSM
accounts that spread harmful viral information. Below, we distinguish our work from the
literature in details.
Identifying PSM accounts. Compared to previous PSM account detection work in [66, 5],
we propose graph-based features and unlike the unsupervised learning approach in [66], we
expand out both the supervised and semi-supervised learning methods. We also develop a
deep neural network and show how our proposed approaches improve them significantly.
Identifying Automatic Accounts. DARPA conducted the Twitter bot detection challenge
to identify and eliminate influential bots [77]. Most of the previous work extracted different
sets of features (tweet syntax, tweet semantics, temporal behavior, user profile, friends and
network features) and conducted supervised or semi-supervised approaches [77, 21, 22].
However, without using content, and network structure, they perform poorly. Also, some of
the features such as tweet semantics depend on the language. It is yet a challenge to apply
these features to other languages such as Arabic. Moreover, unlike our proposed method,
they use friendship (follower/followee) network structure and account related attributes.
Analysis of Terrorist Groups and Detection of Water Armies. Terrorist groups use social
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media for propaganda dissemination [3]. Benigni et al. [7] conducted vertex clustering and
classification to find Islamic Jihad Supporting Community on Twitter. Abdokhodair et al.
[1] studied the behaviors and characteristics of Syrian social botnet. Chen et al. [18] found
that within the context of news report comments, user-specific measurements can distinguish
water army from normal users. Our work is different from them since these methods used
features related to the accounts and network.
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we conducted a data-driven study of inductive and abductive reasonings
on the pathogenic social media accounts. We proposed supervised and semi-supervised
frameworks to detect these users. We achieved the precision of 0.9 with F1 score of 0.63
using the supervised framework. In semi-supervised framework, we are able to detect
more than 29K PSM users by using only 600 labeled data for training and development
sets with the precision of 0.81. Our approaches identify these users without using network
structure, cascade path information, content information. We believe our technique can be
applied in areas such as detection of water armies and fake news campaigns. In the future,
the combination of the supervised approach with the semi-supervised and unsupervised
approaches can provide us with a complete pipeline for identifying PSM accounts.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
6.1 Conclusion
This dissertation focuses on the relationships between different types of reasoning,
known as deductive, inductive, and abudctive, and applying them to address real-world
problems. While data-driven variants of these forms of reasoning have been applied sepa-
rately, there is less work on how these approaches relate and lend themselves to practical
applications. Therefore, as the first step in this thesis, we proposed a method for identifying
potentially violent criminal gang members using inductive and deductive reasonings. In
induction, we leveraged features derived from the co-arrestee network of criminal gang
members and other meta-data to create a supervised model. In deduction, we used the best
model to identify the potential violent individuals from existing criminal individuals. It is
observed that our method outperforms the ones in the literature.
We then focused on geospatial abductive inference method to address the missing person
problem. We developed a data-driven variant of geospatial abductive inference for finding
missing persons. For a given missing person case, and its potential locations reported by
experts, we developed a toolkit to rank-orders the search area. The experimental results
showed that our approach is able to reduce the total search area for standard searched and
when dog team assets obtain a detection.
Utilizing induction and abduction reasonings, we then studied the pathogenic social
media accounts. We proposed a causality-based unsupervised method to detect these
accounts. Considering an extremist cascade as an agent, we aimed to find if an agent is a
pathogenic user. We introduced an unsupervised causality-based framework as well as label
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propagation approach. This approach identified these users without using network structure,
cascade path information, content and user’s information. We evaluated our approach using
Twitter dataset.
In Chapter 5, we expand upon the causal inference framework with graph-based metrics
in order to distinguish PSM accounts from normal users to increase precision and recall. We
thus proposed both supervised and semi-supervised approaches without taking the network
structure, cascade path information and content into account. Results on a real-world dataset
from Twitter highlighted the advantage of our proposed frameworks.
6.2 Future Work
This thesis can be extended in several following directions:
• Working with the police to identify other sources of data to build a more complete
social network of the offenders for the research work in Chapter 2.
• Utilizing a probabilistic variant of the feasibility function, incorporating other features
such as missing person’s corresponding region, age, gender into the proposed model
in Chapter 3.
• Applying our technique in Chapter 4 in the areas such as detection of water armies
and fake news campaigns.
• Combining the proposed semi-supervised approach with unsupervised one in Chap-
ter 4 in order to find the initial seed set for the semi-supervised approach.
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